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WHAT GERMANY IS FIGHTING FOR

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BY

SIR CHARLES WALDSTEIN

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PREFACE.

In presenting this account of German War-Aims, which was written in February of this year, it is all-important to remember, that, whatever changes and concessions are made by the German Government in formulating their Peace Proposals in the future, enforced upon them by the effective military power of the Allies, the war-aims here given represent the aims for which Germany has until now been fighting.

The Chancellor's speech before the Reichstag last month in no way contradicted the aims as given in this book; while the same, in varying degrees, applies to the speeches by representatives of every party. Even the speeches of Herr Scheidemann, Herr Ledebur, the Socialists, while opposing the extreme demands of the Alldeutsche Party, did not clearly repudiate the aims which the sophistry of German aggressive policy includes in the terms of "*defensive* measures for the safety and expansion of the fatherland".

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More and more the issue has become narrowed down to the distinction between *Annexationists* and *Anti-annexationists.* It is well for our Russian Allies to remember, that with every turn in favour of the Central Powers on the military side in the prosecution of this war, will the *Annexationists* uphold or realize their aims; as with every unfavourable turn, ending in final defeat on the battlefield, will the *Anti-annexationists* command the political situation in Germany.

I must also point out, that in the earlier stages of the war, the aggressive demands, in view of an assured German victory, were still more exacting and uncompromising. I would refer the reader to Mr. J. W. Headlam's able exposition in *The Issue* and to a book by S. Grumbach, recently published at Lausanne, *Das Annexionistische Deutschland* (of which an instructive summary is given in an article by "Politicus" in the current number of the *Fortnightly Review*), which shows, by means of quotations of extracts from all the leading German newspapers and from speeches by political leaders, how extreme were these demands in the earlier stages of the war, down to the present day.

Finally, it is well to remember, that, though there have been in Germany from the beginning men less chauvinistic in their political feelings and aspirations and more humane in their thoughts and actions towards the rest of mankind, than those who rule Germany, and

though, no doubt, their numbers are growing with every day, they have hitherto formed a negligible minority of the German people. Though the Kaiser and his military, bureaucratic and chauvinistic supporters were, and are, primarily responsible for this war and the barbarous methods with which it is waged, every section of the German people, every class, every occupation, every political party (including the majority of the Socialists), is responsible for the war-aims as here given. We must also remember that the German soldiers—though ordered by their officers—themselves carried out the atrocities for which they have merited the horrified condemnation of the whole civilized world. Not until the German people of the future gain control of their own political activities and destiny and improve their political education and their social morality, can they be admitted to full and equal membership in the comity of civilized nations.

I must thank Mr. J. W. Headlam and Mr. Edwyn Bevan, as well as my step-daughter, Dorothy Seligman, for generous help in the composition of this book. Two articles in *The Nineteenth Century and After* (Dec., 1916, and April, 1917) have been embodied in substance.

CHARLES WALDSTEIN.

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CONTENTS.

PAGE

PREFACE v

I.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS WAR-AIMS . . 1

II.

TRANSLATION OF THE MANIFESTO 58

III.

THE SOCIAL GULF BETWEEN ENGLAND AND GERMANY . 93

I.

CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS WAR-AIMS.

It cannot be doubted that it is most important for the formation of a sane and clear public opinion, not only among the British people, but among all the Allied nations as well, that they should realize what in their own minds the German people are fighting for. From the beginning of the war, and long before it, throughout every phase of the war itself, and even during these latter days after the Allies have in outline formulated their own war-aims, those of the German Government have been shown to the world with sufficient clearness, in spite of the refusal to formulate them officially in response to the appeal of President Wilson. This being the state of affairs at the present moment, it becomes the more necessary that, by a searching and fair inquiry, the Allied nations, and the neutral peoples as well, should realize for what final ends the Central Empires went to war, and have since waged war. Even if, through the force of circumstance, they may in the future be brought to modify or moderate their war-aims, it will still remain essential to the formation of an equitable public opinion through-

out the Allied world, that the aims which led to this war and have guided its prosecution hitherto should be clearly realized and published. The manifesto of Germany's war-aims, which is here given in full and in literal translation, we claim is fully representative of the German people as a whole, in so far as they have been able to express their will by word and deed: by word in the various pronouncements of their responsible Government, and by deed in the inception of this war and in the methods followed by the German Army and Navy.

In opposition to this claim, it may be urged that the manifesto as published by Dr. Schäfer, which is the official expression of the "Independent Committee for a German Peace" and of the "Six Associations," represents the opinions of the *Alldeutsche* party and of the extreme annexationists. But it will also be seen, from passages in the manifesto itself, that it desires to disassociate itself from these extreme annexationists. Moreover, it will also be seen that, by quoting the *ipsissima verba* from the most recent speeches of the Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg himself, the manifesto does in substance express the views of the German Government.

Now, there can, however, be no doubt that there exist in Germany bodies and individuals who would formulate war-aims differing from those contained in this manifesto: the suppressed "Pacifists" and Minority Socialists, the Majority Socialists having in all essentials acquiesced in Government action. But we would claim, with equal reason and emphasis, that these differing views have not prevailed in the past, and do not prevail in the present;

that, furthermore, in the expression of official opinion, in the course adopted by military and naval authorities, and in the action of these authorities, both on land and at sea, they do not prevail; and, finally, that all these manifestoes of war-aims of corporate bodies and of individuals, not only vary among each other, but directly contradict each other. On the other hand, it also becomes clear that each section of differing opinion, while opposing one aspect or side in the grouping of these several war-aims, and emphasizing the one side at the expense of the other, is represented in the manifesto here given as altogether united in the official pronouncement and the military activity of the ruling German Government of the day which, up to the present, remains fully expressive of the will of the German people.

Moreover, it must be realized that these several sectional manifestoes, differing among each other, represent the interests of different political parties within the German nation as well as the different, and generally antagonistic, economic and business interests of the several sections. The main classification into two opposing camps at the present moment, for instance, between those who advocate a more conciliatory attitude towards the West, especially to England, and concentrate their aggressive energy in the East, while others recommend an understanding with Russia, concentrating their energetic opposition against the Western Powers,—this sub-division is essentially based upon the opposing interests of agriculture and manufacture, of mining and metal industry (*schwerindustrie*) and of shipping and general commerce.

This was clearly recognized in Germany as early as last August, when attempts were made to conciliate the differences between the National German Committee and the Independent German Committee.

"Freiherr von Zedlitz, in a leader in the *Tag* of August 11, discussed the aims of the German National Committee, and strongly recommended that it should work with Dr. Dietrich Schäfer's National Committee. Otherwise there would certainly be friction between the two, though their aims, as he pretended, were identical (a peace 'adequate to the sacrifices and with guarantees for its duration'), and their differences were merely as to the necessary 'means'. They might organize combined demonstrations on Sedan day, which would give valuable encouragement to the confidence of the German people. He suggested that a third party might be successful in bringing the two Committees together, and hinted that a member of the Right would have the greatest chance of success as mediator.

"On August 12 Count Reventlow exposed the futility of this suggestion. The two Committees differed fundamentally in aim. The Schäfer Committee wanted a strong peace East and West, the German National Committee wanted a weak peace in the West.

"Dr. Hugo Böttger, in the same number, tried to explain away the differences of opinions expressed at the various meetings of the National Committee, colouring them all, as far as possible, with Chauvinist tendencies, and warned the Committee to keep itself aloof from party

politics, and not let itself be influenced 'either from above or below'.

"In the *Magdeburgische Zeitung* of August 12, Dr. Böttger stated more clearly than usual how the conflict about war-aims was entangled with questions of internal policy. On one side the agrarian conservative partisans think that the Government is too anxious to conciliate Liberals and Socialists :—

> The Socialists still hanker after the 'Nationale,' and cannot get over their weakness for the Western Powers. Relying as it does on Liberal and Socialist support, the Government is too gentle in its dealings with England, and looks on the Anglo-German conflict as possible ground for a bargain. It is especially weak in its Belgian policy.
>
> On the other hand, Liberals and Socialists are inclined to accuse Conservatives of using foreign policy as a means of embarrassing the Government in order to shape internal policy to their own ends.

"Böttger called on all parties to drop such suspicions. Reforms would come, but after the war. And all parties must meanwhile support the Chancellor's declarations on war-aims. But, of course, he added that meant that the 'private and very contradictory discussions of war-aims' must cease. The nation would be consulted after the decisive military blows had been struck. Till then all must keep silence.

"An anonymous writer in the *Magdeburgische Zeitung*, August 13, protested against this view. All should have confidence in the Government, and it was wrong to

try to influence the Government by expressions of opinion :—

> That the people should have anything to say about the terms of peace is not only injudicious, but most unpractical.

"Meanwhile, on August 12, it was announced that four prominent representatives of the industrial interests, Thyssen, Roechling, Kloeckner, and von Bodenhausen-Degemer (a director of Krupp's firm) had resigned their membership of the German National Committee as a protest against Harnack's insulting references to private industry.

"The *Kölnische Volkszeitung*, August 12, remarked that since ten days had elapsed between Harnack's speech and the resignations, attempts must have been made to induce Harnack to withdraw his remarks 'which, in their comprehensive form, were certainly very insulting,' but apparently without success. Thus the German National Committee had quarrelled with the 'Heavy Industry'. Nor were advances towards the Socialists more successful: the only result was the Socialist Committee's counter-manifesto, and the announcement of a Socialist campaign against those mediators! Thirdly, the first open contribution of the German National Committee to the newspapers was an attack, not on Pacifists, not on Socialists, but on what it called 'Pan-Germans'.

"With passionate satisfaction the *Berliner Neueste Nachrichten*, quoted by the *Kreuzzeitung*, August 13, hailed this sign that the German National Committee, so far from uniting all parties, was causing dissension,

not only among the political parties, not only among the old patriot classes which were 'the creators of Prusso-German prosperity under Wilhelm the Honourable,' but also among its own 'motley' crowd of supporters, even in the inner ring of the Committee. Private industry, especially the armament industry, was one of 'the most meritorious, as well as the most bitterly attacked' elements in the nation. The heavy industry should organize itself for action, for defence of its own interests, which are also those of the nation.

"The *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*, August 12, quoted, *inter alia*, the *Vossische Zeitung's* attempt to suggest that, after all, Harnack's speech was inoffensive, and that, if the report of the resignations was true, it might perhaps be due to the fact that Harnack's inoffensive utterances had been used in a sense not intended, in a sense hostile to the heavy industry, in certain provincial papers. This, said the Berlin correspondent of the *Rheinisch-Westfälische*, was 'childish'. He was glad to add that the *Vossische Zeitung* gave Harnack the good advice to stick in future to theology. *Vorwärts* said that there must be something more behind the move. It saw nothing offensive in Harnack's speech. The Conservative papers showed by their headlines that they realized the importance of the event. Thus the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* headed its notice, '*Die Industrie* leaves the National Committee'. With characteristic reticence the *Norddeutsche Allegemeine Zeitung* said nothing about it at all.

"On August 16 the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, professedly in order to enable its readers to form a judgment on the resignation of these gentlemen from the German National Committee, published two long extracts from Harnack's speech, the first about the future development of industry at home, the second about the peace-aims. The real point of this repetition was, of course, to suggest that Harnack's views still held the field, and represented the mind of the Government.

"At the same time, a heated controversy was carried on when the Socialists published the fact that the adhesion of the Roman Catholic centre-party was being bought at the price of the revocation of the exceptional laws against the Jesuits."

We thus have in Germany the extreme pacifists, and the extreme *Alldeutsche* annexationists. Adherents of both these extreme views exist. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to compute their numbers. The intellectual leaders of the pacifists are in Germany the learned and high-minded Professor W. Förster and in Austria Dr. Alfred Fried. Both are banished and are living in Switzerland. The German Pacifist Association, called the *Bund Neues Vaterland*, associated with the name of the deputy Tepper Lasky, has been suppressed. The extreme annexationists, on the other hand, are still represented by the Yunker and Agrarians, and the extreme war party which dominated Germany immediately before the war, produced the war, and is responsible for the methods adopted on land and at sea, have as their

typical representative Count Reventlow. Though they may at times be troublesome to the Government, as at times they are in the strongest opposition to the Chancellor, the modification of their annexationist demands has been effected, and in this more moderate form is, no doubt, represented by the manifesto that is here printed in translation. Still, it would be a mistake to underestimate their power and numbers, and especially the complete unity and solidarity of their interests and views, which in this respect differ from the interests and views of all other, above all the more moderate parties, possessing no such unity and solidarity—on the contrary, weakened for the time by their disunion.

Among the intermediate parties manifesting various, generally more moderate, war-aims, one has recently come into prominence which advocates a Central European League as put forward in the writings of Dr. Naumann. Their organ is a new periodical, *Die Europäische Zeitung*, formerly called *Europäische Staats- u. Wirtschafts Zeitung*, the editor of which probably is a Bavarian Minister of State, Heinrich von Frauendorfer. Their ambition is to reconcile the various extreme views. These are set forth in a long article on the Central European idea in the number of November 26, 1916. Naturally their main interest lies in the East, and the unbroken line of dominance to reach from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean. If this can be attained, they are strongly in favour of a League of Nations to secure peace in the future. Their positive and construc-

tive views are best represented in this respect by a passage from that article.

With such a principle our plenipotentiaries could go confidently to every Peace Congress and move that a universal society of States be founded whose members should pledge themselves unanimously to carry out the following principle: *According to a scale drawn up by an international Commission, consisting of political economists, statisticians, technical experts, landowners, geographers, and geologists, let all the regions of the world not belonging to the European community of States* (i.e. *all colonies*) *be divided amongst the European States, the United States of America, the South-American States and other States regarded as civilized, on the principle that to every State is assigned a portion in ratio to a figure representing a mean between its population and its technical productiveness, in which partition the fertility and the other technical advantages of the several allotments will be taken into account. This Commission, with a complement of statesmen, philosophers, and theologians* (*missionaries*) *will have regularly to take note whether the rules internationally laid down for the treatment of the natives and for a reasonable utilization of the natural resources of the country, according to the standard of scientific knowledge at the time, are properly observed. At definite periods, which will have to be fixed, a new allotment, rectifying inequalities, will take place.*

As for us Germans, if it were thought too complicated a plan to strike a mean between population and productiveness, and the distribution were based simply upon relative population, we could have no objection, in view of the present map.

If this idea ever met with enthusiastic support amongst

all the nations, then indeed we should have the necessary "atmosphere" for obligatory arbitration. But, alas, there is no civilized nation which would agree to such a proposal —outside Central Europe! If only the proposal could be submitted to Peace Congresses, it would be seen which nations are really ready to submit themselves to the principles of justice. It would be seen that the real champion of international justice is—Central Europe, that even if we could be proved to have begun the war—which we did not —it would still be we who are fighting for civilization.

Hence the question: "Are you a Pacifist first or a Democrat first?"

If the necessary atmosphere cannot be created by the principle we have described winning its way through the nations, then we shall have to try to adjust things approximately in the old way prescribed by history, according to which a single nation, whilst fighting for itself at the height of its efficiency and work, brings the whole world a step forward. For us such an approximation might be achieved on the basis of a Central-European federal system, extended by a somewhat looser connection with Bulgaria and with Turkey as far as the Persian Gulf, and completed by a corresponding Colonial Empire in Central Africa.

The tradition of Individualism and Liberalism in culture suggests at a time like this the question: Has work gone on for centuries with the object of liberating the individual and making him more efficient as a member of society, in order that all these differentiated beings, with their independent lives and ways of thinking and feeling, should be sacrificed to the State? Is the State made for man or man for the State?

It is most interesting and instructive to note how a certain section of the Socialist party seems to favour this general scheme. In an article by August Müller on the problem of European peace in the *Soziliastische Monatshefte* for January 17, occurs the following passage:—

> Conditions of peace which would secure us England's friendship in the future are inconceivable. If England gets no positive gain out of this war, she will try eagerly to bring together fresh coalitions against us; but consent to share her dominion of the world with any other Power—that she would never do. The attempt, therefore, to win England's friendship by concessions is doomed from the outset to failure. It is quite a different matter when we look East, both in the case of Russia and in that of Japan. It is in connection with the Russian problem that German Social Democracy will have to make the most radical change in its old point of view. All declamations about the corruption of the Russian principles of government, all indignation about Tsarism and its methods, do not free us from the necessity of disarming our opponent in the East. Russia has been drawn into a war against Germany because she saw in Germany the strongest support of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the Power interested in keeping order in the Balkans, and the protector of the national independence of Turkey; but Russia had no interests conflicting directly with those of Germany such as could only be vindicated by a war; she had none before the war and she will have none after. Free passage through the Dardanelles, Russia's great war-aim, the Russians can obtain from Germany and its Allies with greater security than from the Entente. . . .

Now the region from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf is in intimate mutual relations with the gigantic neighbouring empire of Russia. The development of this region presupposes not only peace but a regular exchange of products between itself and its Russian neighbour. Socialists especially might be expected to have some understanding for such an order of things in the world. The partitioning of the world into great spheres of influence and economic areas unquestionably means a step in advance in organization and in the production of goods. . . .

For the present we have not got far enough to discuss in an exhaustive way peace problems of such wide range as are implied in the partitioning of the world into great spheres of influence. So much, however, may be considered certain—that Germany, which after the war, in close co-operation with its Allies, will possess in Central Europe and Asia Minor its most immediate sphere of action, will not be able to attach itself in any close way to the British economic area. For what lies behind the British idea of a continuation of the Trade War after the conclusion of peace is just the thought that Great Britain might be able to form an economic coalition, which, by excluding German competition, or at any rate making intercourse with Germany more difficult, would appreciably weaken its rival in the world market, if Great Britain has failed to dispose of that rival in the world war. Russia has opposed these efforts to arrange a Trade War after the war, just because Russia knows the economic needs of the Russian people well enough, necessitating, as they do, close intercourse and exchange of commodities between Russia and the neighbouring regions of Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkans, and Turkey.

It is a most remarkable and significant fact that this Socialist thinks and argues entirely in the spirit of the old-fashioned Machiavellean diplomat of the days of the Congress of Vienna. It makes us pause and ask whether democratic control of foreign affairs will be a panacea against the dominance of the nefarious spirit of olden days in the management of international affairs to secure for the world peace and goodwill among men. A truly humanitarian and international outlook in politics is entirely wanting. We have the peace-disturbing *Hinterland*-policy *à outrance.* In this ideal the world is to be parcelled out into separate spheres of influence which we may hope may all be harmonized with one another in the future. For the present we are justified, however, in asking our German Socialist diplomat what in his scheme will become of the Turkish Empire?

> German interests require sooner or later the solidarity of the whole European Continent, as has been often explained in the *Sozialistiche Monatshefte.* Only when Continental Europe is united together with Asia Minor, as a single coherent economic area (for which Central Europe will be the beginning) can it fully develop its productive power. . . . This economic *Imperium* will then stand beside the other World Empires, both those already in existence and those in course of formation—the British Empire, America, Russia, and finally Eastern Asia, under the hegemony of Japan. . . .

The main ground for this plan devised by a representative of democratic and international interests is cynically admitted to be the prospect that England is

not prepared to be despoiled of her world empire, while Russia may by some means or other be induced to be so. We cannot believe that such views command a great following in the ranks of the German Socialist party. But it remains instructive to note that they do obtain among a section of the Socialist majority.

Finally, we come to the opinions of prominent individuals, who, no doubt, carry weight with a portion of the thinking public in Germany. These are specially interesting as being among the most recent expressions of opinion, and as going further in the direction of moderation than, with the exception of the pacifists, any body of men have as yet published. The most representative views of this kind are those by Maxmillian Harden in his weekly the *Zufunft* for January 20, 1917, an anonymous writer in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* for December, 1916, and Hans Delbrück in the February number of that same periodical.

Maxmillian Harden is one of the ablest publicists of Germany, apparently quite fearless, and at times free from all prejudice. His frankness in stating views which must be intolerable to the ruling powers has often filled us with wonder, and, though he has repeatedly been imprisoned and fined for his boldness, we are still astonished how he has been able to say with impunity what he has often ventured to publish. He is one of the best prose writers of modern Germany, his style resembling in its terseness and brilliancy that of Mr. Bernard Shaw, with whom he shares his fearless love of the paradox and the

cynical over-statement in his opposition to the commonplace and the dominantly-accepted views of his country. He differs from the distinguished English writer in that he has at times ardently identified himself with the aggressive, even militarist, aspirations of his peace-disturbing country. We can recall speeches of his since the war began in which, for instance, he urged the acquisition of the coast of Belgium and Northern France, not necessarily and immediately as an aggressive step towards war with England, but to ensure freedom in the commercial war of the future which, in certain eventualities, might lead to actual war, and would then put Germany in a position to fight on equal terms with England for maritime supremacy.

On the present occasion, however, in his article headed "After the Notes," he goes as far as anyone probably can go to-day in Germany, at any rate in public print, towards meeting the peace-terms outlined by the British Government in their Note to Mr. Wilson of January 12. So far from regarding these terms as wholly inacceptable to Germany, Harden contends that they might well be taken as a basis for bargaining. A great deal of his article is taken up with surveying, as an object lesson for the present generation, the events in the history of Frederick the Great, which led up to the Peace of Hubertusburg—a Peace which appeared at the time a tame surrender, but which "children's children praise as a work of courageous statesmanship".

The anonymous writer in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*

for December, 1916, is most remarkable for his moderation, and stands out in strong contrast to the mass of his countrymen, as they have hitherto shown themselves to us in this war, in the favour he shows to England:—

> Let us examine the claims of the different States of the Quadruple Entente in order to see how far they severally conflict with the conditions necessary for our existence and development. Russia claims Constantinople, Galicia, and land in the West for Russian peasants; France is fighting for Alsace-Lorraine; Italy stretches her hand after the unredeemed regions. Amongst them all England is the only State which was concerned for the maintenance of the *status quo*. True, Germans have abundant right to see the great sin committed by England against humanity in the fact that England—we cannot exactly say *contrived* this war, for that would go beyond the historical truth—but made this war possible by her adhesion to the Franco-Russian group. Yet statesmanship—we mean by this a combination of cool calculation with an all-round sense of justice, which keeps itself equally far from rash preferences and from dislikes and resentment—will discover that it is easier to find a golden bridge to those who maintain the *status quo* than to those who want to upset it, will credit the English with believing in good faith that their policy had in the first instance a preventive aim, viz. the maintenance of their existing possessions which they believed to be menaced by Germany. This menace is a delusion, but we have no right to cast doubt on the *bona fides* of the delusion. No statesman, unless he reckons with such processes of thought in his enemies, unless he frees himself from that journalistic cant, which sees in his own

people nothing but virtue and right, and in the enemy nothing but wrong and criminality, will be able to sit down at the table at which the negotiators discover the foundations of a steadfast peace.

So far from there being a reiteration of the cant concerning *Perfide Albion*, of which we have heard and hear so much, he insists upon our honesty and *bona fides*. He even maintains with emphasis that, commercially and economically, so far from there being essential antagonism, the two nations are complementary to one another; and on this point he quotes the former German Ambassador to England, Count Metternich, whose views in the main we may assume this article to express. The following passage conveys the pith of the article:—

"A great mistake," some one will answer. "Between us and England stands the fact of commercial jealousy, and this gives rise to an irreconcilable antagonism." Well, one can only be grateful to hear people confine the antagonism in this way to a mere question of the belly. Certainly the German *parvenu* by his industry outstripped the supine aristocrat in many lines—though it is far from true that he did so in all. What this means is that we have, not a clash between German and English views of the world, as certain idealists have asserted, but a clash of interests. Yet this clash is hardly to be brought to an issue through the means chosen by England — throttling or emasculation. The experiences of two years ought to have shown that even the most appalling hecatombs do not lead to the desired result. Is it in these circumstances wise, from the English point of view, to give out the watchward, "Conquer or perish"? Is

it wise to compare, as *The Times* has done, England to a bulldog that will not relax its bite, when one has had to learn by experience that the other dog too gives proof of no less tenacity, and when one sees the *tertios gaudentes* in Asia and America biding their time there in the background? On the other hand, the many excellent heads and hearts amongst us, who are racked by doubts as to whether we can and shall "force England to her knees" to the desirable extent and clench their fists in wrath, might find the courage to ask themselves another question. Is it really true that such an issue is the only one which can secure what we need for the future? It is just in this respect that their views seem short-sighted, since, while we have every interest in curing England of her delusion, her presumption, and her hostility, we have no interest at all in selecting this particular enemy to inflict upon him the lot which he desired to inflict upon us. No, England, condemned to impotence, would leave a gap, that later on we should desire to have filled, in the system of States. Also our friends in Austria-Hungary, in Sweden, in Turkey, and the Balkans, would not be particularly grateful if we spared Russia in the delusive hope of securing elbow-room against England —a delusive hope because Russia never can and never will take the place of the friend ready to protect our rear. Is there no other solution? Our mind recurs to an admirable speech by the former Ambassador, Count Metternich, in which, equipped with sure statistical data, he demonstrated that the activity of German and English trade, so far from implying mutual antagonism, was mutually complementary.

Finally, we come to the most recent views of Hans Delbrück as developed in the February number of that

same monthly review. He here examined the Note of the Entente to President Wilson. He is much less inclined to see hope of any understanding in it than Harden. At the same time, he continues to oppose strongly the party in his own country which desires annexations on the West. But we must bear in mind that in his previous utterances he has strongly favoured the exaction of adequate war-indemnities, which even the manifesto of the Six Associations warily omits to mention. He evidently favours a stronger aggressive policy towards Russia as well as in the South-east of Europe and in Asia Minor. Where he apparently is willing to make the greatest concessions is in Belgium; and he gives very cogent reasons for this by a practical appeal to German interests in the following passage:—

> The decisive point where our moderation must show itself practically is still, of course, Belgium. It would certainly be best if at this stage the question was not spoken of, but in that case silence would have to be observed by both sides. Since the other side goes on persistently trying to work up public opinion to the view that sovereignty over Belgium is something indispensable for our future, then neither can those who hold this idea to be a great and a pernicious mistake remain silent. True, the number of those who wish to annex Belgium outright or incorporate it under any form in the German Empire, has undoubtedly very much diminished. The idea, however, is still widespread that Belgium must remain indeed inwardly independent, and yet be in a political, economic, and military sense subordinate to the German Empire. As to the *political* subordination, we may cut that

out, in so far as that is taken to mean that the state in question is to have no diplomatic representatives of its own. So long as in other ways the state remains independent it can always pursue an independent policy, since for that it is not essential to have any openly accredited representatives. Male and female agents (as Bismarck repeatedly pointed out) suffice fully, under some disguise or other. To prohibit by treaty an independent policy is to attempt something with inadequate means. As to *economic* attachment, it may be asked whether Germany would gain any advantage from that. Antwerp stands in greater need of Germany as its Hinterland than Germany does of Antwerp as a port. It is a complete illusion to suppose that an economic union would create a rapprochement of spirits. The experiences connected with the German Zollverein of 1834 to 1866 have shown that such a union, even where it brought the greatest advantages to all sides, contributed rather to estrange than to reconcile spirits, since all the several parties were continually filled with the preconceived idea that the customs were in the last resort framed to serve the interests of some other party, and continuous angry charges were always brought by one side or the other. There remains, therefore, the *military* subordination of Belgium, and people imagine that Belgium might be attached by a military convention to the German Empire. The Belgian Army would be trained on the German pattern; perhaps under the command of German generals it would be brought to the highest conceivable pitch of organization. But who will give us any guarantee that this army which we have organized so admirably will really range itself on our side if it again comes to a war? Even if the convention laid it down that Belgium should be at the bidding

of the German Empire, not only for a war of defence but unconditionally for every war, Belgium would consider itself to be as little bound by such a convention, if it did not want to be, as Prussia was bound in 1813 to Napoleon: and even German generals in command would have as little power to hold the Belgians as Marshal Macdonald to hold General Yorck. Even isolated German garrisons in Belgium would make no difference, since Belgium has about eight million inhabitants, could, therefore, in a few days, get hundreds of thousands of men under arms and overwhelm every German garrison, perhaps even fortresses occupied by Germans, before help could come to them from Germany. If the idea is to transport the whole Belgian army to German garrisons while there is still peace, and occupy Belgium itself with German troops, that, too, would be extremely dangerous, and impossible to carry out in practice. The German towns would beg to be excused the honour of having Belgian garrisons. The German soldiers in Belgium would not be able to cross the street safely at night, unless Germany, at the same time, took into its hands the police and the administration of justice in Belgium. Belgium in the permanent occupation of the German troops would mean Belgium condemned to live permanently under martial law, a simply impossible prospect. You can, indeed, maintain martial law for a few years, but you cannot make it eternal. On the other hand, Belgian police and Belgian judges would not protect German officers and soldiers against attacks and waylaying.

We can conclude a military convention only with a state which is bound to us by its own sentiments and its own interests, and wishes to remain permanently bound to us, as

we expect in the case of the future Poland. But to bind a state permanently by conventions and treaties is impossible. The one and only form under which Belgium could really be permanently bound in a military way to Germany is by the incorporation of the Belgians in the German Army itself, that is, by the inclusion of Belgium in the German Empire. Is that what is wanted? It is not necessary to waste words on this point since, in Germany, there is hardly any single person left who asks for that; and if any such person still exists, one's only answer to him could be that he was like the Trojans of old, who wished to drag into the city with their own hands the Wooden Horse in whose belly the enemies were hidden. . . .

The *Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung* has put forward a positive suggestion in the sentence, "There must be no Belgian army any more, but at most a Flemish army, and a Walloon army". That is something intelligible, but, so far as our question is concerned, all that would follow from this would be that in the event of war it would not be the Belgian army but the Flemish and the Walloon armies which would go over to the enemy, and that the better we had trained them, in virtue of our military convention, the more efficient allies we should have provided for the enemy.

But it is as well to note the significant limitation to this suggestion of the restitution of Belgian autonomy contained in the passage which follows it:—

With regard, however, to the Belgian question in general, Herr von Zedlitz has read into my observations something which I never meant. I said that there was no middle way between annexation and the restoration of liberty, or that,

at any rate, nobody had, so far, been able to indicate any such way; but I never said that the restoration of the *status quo ante* was, therefore, the only thing left. The simple restoration of the state of things before the war has, indeed, been made an obsolete proposition, and one excluded by existing relations. The administrative division between the Flemish and Walloon regions which the German Government has carried out cannot be undone again, and must have the most powerful effects. Even if, after we have evacuated Belgium, a certain reaction of the idea of Belgian unity sets in against the Flemish manifestoes of independence, even if—what is certainly very improbable—the Flemish University of Ghent should be suppressed, nevertheless, when a movement of this kind has once been set going, it has a very marked vitality of its own, will unquestionably, in all circumstances, make itself felt hereafter, and will tend to prevent Belgium from becoming a mere dependency of the Anglo-French Alliance.

It is thus important to note that none of these several manifestoes which we have examined, with the exception perhaps of the extreme pacifists, as far as Germany is concerned, face the possibility of a restitution of the *status quo ante bellum.* Even as regards Belgium, the most extreme anti-annexationists for the West, such as the anonymous writer in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* and Hans Delbrück himself do not promise full restitution of the Belgian kingdom, still less do they in any way suggest reparation.

What must strike us above all, in considering these several expressions of war-aims as regards Germany—

even omitting those of Austria and their Balkan Allies—is the diversity, if not the antagonism, of these several aims. We must, above all, be struck by the contrast in this respect to the war-aims of the Western Allies, as already expressed in the Note to President Wilson, which present a clear-cut and decided unity. If we consider the British public alone, in spite of any differences of opinion which may in the course of time manifest themselves on minor points, the main line of purpose in the prosecution of this war has never for one moment differed among the political parties (exclusive of the pacifists), nor within the nation as a whole.

But it would be a mistake to think that there is no unity of intention as regards war-aims in Germany. On the contrary, there is the greatest and most effective unity represented by the Government, itself directed by the Military party. The official utterances of the Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg, clearly reflect the war-aims as laid down in Schäfer's manifesto, both as regards the East and the West.

On the other hand, the method applied by this Government is to encourage each one of these antagonistic parties within the Empire, in so far as they can contribute directly or indirectly to the consummation of the official war-aims in the increase of power for Germany, both in the East and in the West and all over the world. I am informed that this is even the case with the pacifists, and I have been told on good authority that Dr. Fried, who is supposed to be living in banishment in

Switzerland, has on several occasions been allowed to return to Austria, and is in constant communication with the Austrian Minister at Berne. I find it almost impossible to believe (though I have been assured of this also on good authority) that the same applies to Professor Förster. But of this there can be no doubt: that whenever and wherever the propagation of peaceful sentiments from Germany tends to weaken the war-like energy of the Allied nations and of neutral peoples, the German pacifists are encouraged to express and to disseminate their views.

In the same way, however much the Socialist minority and its leaders may be oppressed and persecuted, and however much the Socialist majority may be antagonized in definite directions, such views as those by the Socialist Müller, as quoted above, can be turned to immediate use, and there can be no doubt that the most is made of them at this moment in Russia, and will be utilized in the future. What is most significant is the fact that the manifesto of the "Intellectuals" and of the Six Associations were repressed in 1915 and 1916, but are now favoured with full freedom of publication. We are informed by Delbrück, in the article quoted above, that the "Independent Committee" (our manifesto of Professor Schäfer) "took the liberty of expounding its political programme in the form of an address of homage to the Emperor," and, in doing so, demanded "the increase of German power in the East and in the West". The answer issued from the Privy Cabinet was to the effect

that "His Majesty commands the expression of his thanks for the address of homage and the view of fidelity". Dr. Delbrück adds that "the political advice and desires were, therefore, declined with a cold friendliness". But we know too well the methods applied by the Kaiser and his Government in Germany to repress the expression of political opinions with which they disagree, or which they consider in any way antagonistic to their political or military ends, to admit of any of the fine shadings of reproof which Dr. Delbrück desires to see in the Kaiser's reply.

As a matter of fact, this method of dealing with all parties, friendly or inimical, troublesome or helpful, has always been the one applied from the days of Bismarck, and even before that date, by such a Government, which uses not only racial and national differences, but also all differences of political opinion on the principle of *divide et impera.*

This was eminently the case as regards the treatment of the *Alldeutsche* party and of the extreme militarists in Germany before the war; and on this subject I may be allowed to speak from first-hand knowledge on the very best authority.

Count Wolff Metternich[1] was for many years one of my

[1] In spite of the feelings of strong revulsion and condemnation which those Germans who have been responsible for this war, and the unchivalrous and brutally barbarous methods with which it has been waged, have aroused in me and in all right-minded people, I must in fairness record that in the past I was grateful for the generous help which was extended to me in the first place by Count Metternich as well as by Count Bülow

personal friends, in whose integrity of character, high-minded and upright patriotism, modified by a sense of reasonableness and justice towards others, I have had, and still have, the greatest faith. I am firmly convinced that he was and is cognizant and appreciative of the true qualities of the British people, as he also is conscious of the failings and faults of his own people. He distinctly was Anglophile, and desired to maintain friendly and fair relations between the two countries and their Governments. From about the end of the last century to 1911, I had frequent conversations with him on matters political, and on the relations between the several European States, on peace and war, etc., etc. Though he was aware of the deep interest which I took in the broader political issues, he was also aware that I

and by the Kaiser. Count Metternich and Prince Bülow did their best to advance a scheme (which only failed because of a personal accident in its organization) for the assurance of truth in the distribution of foreign news in the Press throughout the world and to which prominent men in all the civilized quarters of the globe had already given their support. These two, with the Kaiser, also gave enthusiastic adhesion to my scheme for the International Excavation of Herculaneum. In this the Kaiser joined the late King Edward, President Loubet and President Roosevelt, while the heads of other states had expressed their willingness to co-operate as well. This project for the International Excavation of Herculaneum (in which I was effectively supported by Mr. Leonard Shoobridge) had not only a scientific and specially archæological object in our eyes, but was intended to mark an initial step of great importance in the betterment of international relations. It was to present to the world in a practical and tangible form the co-operation of all civilized states for a great object to advance our common civilization, and thus to bind together in actual work the League of Nations that stood for culture and progress.

held no official position whatever in politics, and was not directly concerned in them. Our conversations, which in no way partook of a secret or even confidential (implying that they were not to be repeated to others) character, and which were frequently extended far into the night, touched upon every conceivable subject of politics, sociology, and philosophy, and assumed (I am sure on both sides) the character of candour and truthfulness. My own hope for Germany, as conveyed to him, was, that it should develop its constitution on the liberal and democratic side and cast off its militaristic and autocratic aggressiveness, and that thus the way could be prepared for a closer understanding between the civilized Western Powers which stood for freedom, culture, and peace. But, owing to the various events succeeding the Kaiser's telegram to Kruger, I on several occasions conveyed to him my misgivings concerning the peaceful intentions of Germany. I especially drew his attention to the active propaganda of the *Alldeutsche* party and the definite news which we had of their avowed animosity to England. He admitted that such views were held in Germany by a group of people; but he insisted upon maintaining that they represented a negligible quantity.

"You have your extreme Jingos over here who do not count, we have our *Alldeutsche* militarists who also do not count. The great thing for all of us who are right-minded people is to pull together and thus to counteract the nefarious influence of these people." I also found him in complete agreement as to the undesira-

bility, not only in the interests of European peace, but also in the interests of Germany herself, that Germany should strive to increase her colonial possessions at the cost of those of the existing colonial states and empires; that, so long as Germany enjoyed equal privileges for her commercial expansion over the world, there was no need whatever for aggressive encroachments on colonial possessions. Moreover, he was strongly convinced (and as is manifest from the quotations of his words in the recent article in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* quoted above) that the economic and commercial interests of Germany and England, so far from necessarily conflicting, could and ought to be harmonized. He thus saw no cause for antagonism which might lead to war in the clashing of these national interests. When I mentioned to him German aspirations in South America, and especially in Asia Minor, as connected with the Bagdad Railway scheme, he assured me that Germany had no intentions of annexation or even colonial expansion in these regions.

At the time I put full faith in these statements of my friend, and I still believe in his sincerity. But I may be allowed to add that, in spite of this conviction as regards this one statesman, the disquieting events which succeeded one another in the diplomatic, naval, and military aggressiveness of Germany during these years, led me to the conviction that we ought to do all in our power to put ourselves in a state of efficient self-defence, and I accordingly joined Lord Roberts' National Service

League. The only point in which my friend and I were clearly and distinctly at variance was in the estimate we formed of France. To me France has ever been the country of intellectual and political courage, guiding and inspiring an effective national imagination. Her contribution to the world, to the defence of civilization, freedom, and culture, were, and are such, that history for all times would be the poorer without them. This emphatically was not the view held by Count Metternich. He thought and maintained that French and German, as well as French and English ideals, were antagonistic to one another. I clearly stated to him my conviction that, since the inauguration of the Entente Cordiale with France (whatever binding obligations this might imply compared with a full *alliance*), I could not conceive of England ever standing by, and allowing France to be crushed by any enemy. I venture still to maintain now, as I held from the beginning of the war that, whether the crime against Belgium had been committed by Germany or not, and whatever the definite terms of the Entente may have put in verbal formulation, England was morally bound not to stand by and see France crushed, and no British subject could have held up his head without shame if we had not lived up to this moral obligation.

I was met in the same spirit by Prince Bülow on the two occasions when I spent a few days with him at Norderney in furtherance of scientific and philanthropic schemes in which I was interested. With great frankness he met all my objections, and refuted all my doubts

as to the peaceful intentions of Germany. "How can you sensible people in England believe that it is in any way our intention to endeavour to wrest from you any of your colonial possessions? Has not the South African war proved to you, to us, and to the world, how difficult it is, even for the greatest maritime power, possessed of the most perfect machinery for the transportation of troops, as well as of an enormous foothold of friendly colonies contiguous to a disaffected people and the area of fighting, to subdue a small republic against the will of the people. How could we, without these overwhelming advantages which you possess, even if we might be victorious in an actual campaign, continue to hold such distant colonies against a strong enemy population? We could never dream of doing this, either in South Africa, Australasia, Canada, or anywhere else in the world. Moreover, I assure you, that if it were possible for us, with the invention of colossal airships which could convey whole army corps over the sea and safely deposit them on English soil,—if it were thus possible for us to subdue England, with our heel on London, and the whole country in our power, what good would it do us? We should have killed the goose that lays the golden egg. You are absolutely essential to us, economically and commercially. You are our best customers. The destruction of English prosperity would spell ruin for Germany. We never dream of such aggression." He answered my doubts concerning Pan-German agitation in the same sense as did Count Metternich. But he

made this significant addition: "They are of no consequence now; but if you on your side continue your agitation, and it grows in intensity and extent, it may react to such a degree that we may no longer be able to hold our people here". My answer to him was then, as it would be now, that, even our extremist Jingo agitators insisted upon military preparedness merely on *defensive* lines and for defensive purposes; whereas the Pan-German militarists were avowedly and professedly of an aggressive character, and held up to the German people the ideals of continental as well as colonial expansion, ending in world-power and world-domination.

Finally, I must record a similar conversation with the German Emperor during and after a dinner in London on the occasion of his visit to England and his sojourn at Highcliff.[1] He was most emphatic in his protestations of peace and of friendship towards England. With all the manifestations of sincere emotion he confessed to the deep pain which England had brought to his heart. "Every word and every act of mine is misconstrued or misunderstood. Whatever I do for the good of both countries and for the peaceful

[1] On this occasion he asked me—as I knew before he had asked nearly everybody he met in England—"Have you read Houston Chamberlain?" "I bought the book some years ago and tried to read it to the end, but could not stand a work of such superficial and grossly unscientific over-generalization. It is, moreover, one of the most mischievous books of modern times." "What," he exclaimed with all signs of horrified dissent, "it is the greatest book of modern times." "I fear we shall never agree," was my rejoinder. It was soon after this that an English translation of the book appeared and had a wide circulation in England.

understanding between them, so that they may co-operate for the good of the world, is mistrusted and misinterpreted as selfishness and aggression. I am wedged in between two great Powers, Russia and Great Britain, with France ever ready at my flank, and I really do not know which of you hates me most,—I really believe you do. And with all this agitation without, I must struggle to keep my people quiet at home; and you never held me to do it." The words sounded deeply sincere. Who can ever fathom and justly balance the complexities of the human heart and mind!

During all this period, however, whenever it was a question of the increase of the army or navy, these *Alldeutsche* militarists were called in to help and were fondled and encouraged. It was no question then of holding the bloodhounds in the leash; they were even egged on in their passions and cupidity. The undeniable facts of recent history speak for themselves. They have been clearly and irrefutably stated, point by point. And now, at the very moment when proposals for peace are initiated by Germany, the war party reigns supreme, and we know beyond all doubt what their aims are. Ruthless submarine warfare is applied, not only against belligerents, but against the smallest, powerless neutrals. At the very moment when concessions are thus made from certain quarters in Germany itself, when the German army retreats from its lines in France, and peace approaches more and more within the sphere of actual vision, the stupidly cruel methods of frightfulness advocated by Bernhardi are put into full use in France.

Beyond all possible needs or advantages from the strategical point of view, villages are ruthlessly destroyed, the furniture and household goods of rich and poor are either carried off or wantonly destroyed; apple-trees are cut down; not only men, but girls are driven off into captivity, and—almost incredible—wells are poisoned. Is this in the spirit of the concessions advocated by Delbrück, and those who look for restitution in the West? Belgium is to be retained: the most extreme advocate of Western concessions insists upon maintaining the division between the Flemings and the Walloons. The last of their present gains which will be given up by the Germans will be Belgium. For, from the beginning of this war they entered Belgium, not because of strategic necessity or advantage, but because they clearly intended to remain there, and to keep it as a necessity for the expansion of the German Empire. This is at the core of all German aims. Whatever their words, all their actions of recent days in no way point towards peace and moderation, sympathy and generosity.

The manifesto of war-aims which is here given in translation is the one which dominates the German people and is the efficient guide to all diplomatic as well as to military and naval activity of the German nation.

German demands on the conclusion of peace may be summarized in plain words as follows:—

1. As regards France. The territory already occupied must be retained, especially those districts which are "industrially the richest," such as Briey-Longwy.

Military authorities will have to decide which other parts are to be claimed, even those not yet in German occupation, such as Belfort, Toul, and Verdun. When the moment has arrived for a renewed offensive in the West, the question of the north-western seaboard of France will be considered.

2. So far from Restitution and Reparation of Belgium, that unhappy country is to be for ever taken from its present rulers and people. It is not to be *annexed* in the full technical and legal meaning of that term; but it is to be subdivided into two main parts, the Flemish and Walloon. The Flemish, the Northern or Germanic part, is to be in some form under German control from the military, administrative, as well as economical, point of view. From the latter point of view this will be not only advantageous, but necessary for German industrial and commercial expansion. Of course it contains practically all the flourishing and commercial centres, Antwerp, Brussels, including even Liège. The remaining—Walloon—portion "need even not be administered uniformly". "The districts of the Ardennes and the Meuse, of especial military importance to us, could be organized separately. Belgian Luxemburg belonged to the German Confederation between 1815 and 1839, in the eastmost Arrondissement (Arel) German is spoken even to-day." On the Flemish sea-coast strongly fortified harbours can be established.

3. All the Polish and Russian districts in German possession must be retained. The great potential agricultural resources of these territories can be exploited

when they are inhabited anew by the Russian settlers of German origin who are now oppressed in Russia, while some agriculturists from Germany—returned soldiers and others—may rejoice in the possession of a flourishing rural home. Even some of the German emigrants in the Western United States and Canada might return to the fertile land offered to them.

4. Concerning England, the manifesto is singularly reticent. It even goes out of its way positively to abjure the ambition of forming a rival world-empire ; also to lay no claim to the annexation of the great British Colonies. Perhaps the unpleasant experiences of a very tangible nature furnished by the fighting forces from these British Colonies may have modified the opinions held before the war by their militarists and expansionists. Of course all her Colonies are to be restored to Germany after the war, with the addition of the Belgian Congo. Also Freedom of the Sea is to be established. The command of strong harbours on the Belgian coast and, perhaps, also in Northern France (if Bellona continues to favour them) is all that can or need be demanded for the present. As regards the East, however, the demands are emphatic and clear, and this requirement concerning England equally concerns Turkey, and is put under the paragraph concerning the Turkish Empire : " The Bagdad Railway, in spite of any claims on the part of England, must be extended to the open sea : unhampered overland communications from the North Sea to the waters of the Indian Ocean—nay, to India itself ".

This section dealing with Turkey, moreover, begins

with the following momentous admission: "Our relations to Turkey constituted the real and ultimate cause (*sind es letzten Endes gewesen*) which drew us into this war".

With occasional lapses of this kind, the manifesto is more instructive for what it leaves unsaid than for what is definitely stated. Colonial and overseas ambitions are for the time suppressed, and all efforts must be consolidated on the strengthening of European possessions and spheres of influence on the Continent, inland and on the seaboard. Colonies must be ignored for the present. When Germany is really strong in Europe, the rest will follow. Any mention of the American Continent, South or Central America, is studiously avoided. Manifestly the same applies to this case: Strength at home will assure strength abroad.

Such are, in plain words, the definite war-aims. Naumann's Mid-European Federation scheme is not favoured, or, if so, with essential limitations. Holland, the Balkan States, Switzerland, Denmark, etc., are not mentioned or are slurred over. By an interesting implication Holland (which gains in its national strength through the Flemings using the same language) will share the German dominance of the "Flemish Commonwealth" when once it is constituted. But the Polish Provinces of Prussia and Alsace-Lorraine have taught the lesson not to allow those new spheres of German political power to share the blessings of the Imperial German Constitution and to make their voice heard in German affairs in the future. Military and economic

dominance of them; but no voice in the Reichstag! The same warning is extended to all the smaller States which might enter the Mid-European League; they must not be a burden to Germany (they might be allowed to be of advantage to that God-favoured Empire), and must bear their own economic and military burdens.

These are the terms demanded by Germany for the conclusion of a peace.

From the lips of the Chancellor, as well as in the speeches and publications of almost every German soldier, politician, and publicist, we have been informed that the reasons for their demands are the security of the German Empire, so that "never again can such an attack be made on their freedom". The ground on which the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was justified, urged by Moltke and his military assessors against the advice of Bismarck, was the defensive security of the new German Empire. We then heard nothing of the economic independence, the right for free development and expansion of the industrial resources of this growing economical community which in reality forms the chief justification for the war-aims in all the present manifestoes.

Without special knowledge of military matters, it can still be understood how the possession of Alsace-Lorraine, especially the fortresses of Metz and Strassburg, may have been considered by Moltke as necessary for the defensive security of Germany. But we entirely fail to see how the occupation of Belgium, and especially the possession of a marshy sea-coast with military harbours in immediate proximity to the island coast of the strongest

maritime Power, adds to the *defensive* security of the German Empire compared with the present German harbours on the North Sea and the Baltic, joined together by the Kiel Canal, and protected by most tortuous and difficult approaches from either side. But we can under certain conditions of internal German power and exterior complications—weakening for the time being the actual or potential enemies—see how such a coast and its harbours may be most useful for *offensive* warfare. Nor can we quite understand how the command of communications from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean is necessary for the defensive security of the German Empire; though we can well comprehend its offensive value.

What we can however fully understand, and what must appeal to the meanest German intelligence—perhaps even to that of the meanest inhabitant of Belgium, France, Russia, or the British Empire—is the great economic gain and the consequent increase of wealth to Germany in the possession of the rich Belgian industrial centres, the manufacturing and mining districts of Northern France, the fertile lands of Western Russia and Poland, as well as the complete control of the communications between the North Sea and the Indian Ocean, with the power of protective and prohibitive tariffs against all other nations. We can also realize that, with military predominance and the possibility of naval predominance as well, backed by enormous increase in wealth, the offensive power of Germany all over the world is fraught with the most alluring possibilities in the minds of the German people. But these prospects do not neces-

sarily commend these war-aims with the same intensity of favour to the peoples who are thus robbed or threatened.

What is most astounding in all this is its *naïveté:* that an intelligent nation and its intellectual leaders should be unable to realize the elementary mentality of other people and other nations, who are not all complete idiots unmindful of their own security, independence, and interests.

It cannot be considered inapposite or flippant to introduce what I have to say on this point by a German pleasantry illustrative of at least one side of their normal life before the passion of war submerged all their social virtues and exaggerated all their failings and vices. At a *table-d'hôte* dinner, during the first days of the asparagus season, a large platter containing undergrown specimens of that vegetable was handed round among the guests, so that each could take his limited share. Unfortunately, it first came to a fat and voracious German, who proceeded calmly to cut off all the heads and the riper green parts, and to place them on his plate. His horrified neighbour turned to him with the exclamation: "Why, you are cutting off all the heads of the asparagus!" "What are you talking about?" replied the fat man, "that is the very best part of them!"

What must strike the reader in considering the German war-aims put forward in their totality, and what has struck us in so many other publications and authoritative statements of their views and demands—to ignore en-

tirely the brutality and barbarism of their war-methods and of individual atrocities—is the apparently complete absence of any impulse which makes for fair-play or manifests the possession of altruistic imagination, sympathy, the sense of proportion and of humour. Like the gentleman of the asparagus, they think it quite enough to say, "This is necessary or even good for us". The one line of argument which led to Von Bethmann Hollweg giving deliberate expression to this amoral principle —as though in human society it corresponded to *a law of nature*—"necessity knows no law," is the one and only argument of a social or moral nature put forward in this manifesto, it having again and again been urged as the moral justification for German expansion before and since the war. As has been quoted above, they say, "Right or wrong, we need more power and we must have it". "Among the various aims for which we are struggling, two stand out clearly and pre-eminently, and for these we are fighting: in the West we must gain possession of the Flemish coast-line, including a part of Northern France; and in the East we must secure the line of direct communication from the North Sea to the Bagdad Railway and the Persian Gulf, nay beyond that, to the Indian Ocean and to India itself. Undeterred by English claims, the Bagdad Railway must be carried by us to the open sea; unfettered overland communication from the North Sea to the waters of the Indian Ocean, even to India itself!" These are the words of the manifesto itself. It also candidly admits that Germany's relations

to Turkey in their bearings upon these national aims "were the real final causes" which drew Germany into this war. In spite of all previous protestations made by the German Government to its people and to all neutrals, it is also here clearly admitted that, though Russia may have been the first enemy it had to face in this war, the real enemy was, and is, and will ever remain, England; because she stands in the way of the realization of these two chief aims for which Germany is waging this war. They seem to say: "this National need of ours is what we are fighting for, and no higher aims are necessary. We need not consider the claims and interests of humanity or the rights and interests of other States, large or small—these can look after themselves. Phrasemongers and dreamers may prattle about this, not the truly patriotic Germans."

The whole basis of such national and political principles is clearly and confessedly amoral. If it does claim morality, it is pure Nietzschean morality,[1] preaching survival of the strongest as the principle of morality, the apotheosis of the "Will to Power".

One specious concession is apparently made to the moral consciousness of the civilized world. It is summed up in the word Kultur. But even Kultur is modified and limited to German Kultur; and, by the facile self-deception of sophistical argumentation, the German people are persuaded that, in establishing and furthering

[1] See Part II., chap. i., pp. 168 *seq.* on Nietzsche's Ethics in my *Aristo-democracy*, etc.

their own Kultur, they are directly benefiting humanity at large and all other nations. Only through the increase of their material power can the blessings of German Kultur be enforced upon the reluctant States and Nationalities, into which it will be carried by the force of arms, and to humanity at large beyond. It would only be weakening the Will to Power to realize the fact that these other nationalities have their own Kultur, and to sympathize with them, or even to apprehend their rights and interests in guarding their own Kultur.

Students of German social history (*Kultur-geschichte*) during the years preceding this war noticed this change in the mentality of Germany, this degeneration as regards its standards of public morality. For the new terms *Real-Politik* and *Interessen-Politik* were constantly in the mouths of its leaders, from the Kaiser down to the political stump-speaker. When pointing out this ominous change in the political training of the German people to the then German Chancellor, Prince Bülow (while discussing with him the scheme for the international excavation of Herculaneum in 1904), the present writer was informed by him, that "the German people required such stiffening of their political fibre, that they had been fed for ages on the pabulum of romantic sentimentality and fantastic catchwords, and were unfitted to cope with the real problems of the national foreign policy of their country; that they required sobering down and the strong infusion of materialistic common-sense in the realization of their true interests". The result has been that the German idealist

and romanticist of old—who in reality did not long survive the Revolution of 1848—died a natural or unnatural death with the advent of the Prussian. Since 1870 he has more and more been replaced by the German *Streber*, whose numbers and whose influence and power have steadily grown, until he has dominated German politics, and has finally triumphed in forcing this war upon the German people and upon the world at large.

Even the last shred of Kultur torn from the banner of German romanticism and idealism is dragged down and thrown into the dust-heap of useless rubbish by the truthful and cynical confession of the intellectual representatives of the German people as expressed in *Das Grössere Deutschland.* In the number of the 27th of January, 1917, which contains the first half of the war-aim manifesto which is given in translation below, there immediately follows it an article by Dr. Karl Mehrmann on *Kultur- oder Interessen Politik.* The following passages from that article will show what importance is attached to the claims of Kultur as a factor in German war-aims:—

"We have been very profligate with the use of the word Kultur in this war. One cannot free oneself from the suspicion that, in constantly holding before our own eyes and those of others our mission of culture, we endeavoured to provide ourselves with some moral support, as if we had thought it necessary to justify ourselves in the eyes of neutrals, and as if we had lived in the delusion that we should thereby make an impression upon

our adversaries. One might suspect that we had quailed at our own courage, when without having declared war, we fell upon Belgium. The words 'necessity knows no law' sounded so courageous. Still, it was only the courage of the political defensive, not that of diplomatic offensive. A more active statesmanship, filled more with the pluck to come to grips with the foe ('On to him!' —*Ran an den Feind!*) would, from the outset, have understood better how to place the guilt on the shoulders of the adversary and to put him in the wrong—even 'neutral' Belgium. From that day onward our policy could not free itself from this plea of necessity (*Notstandsgefühl*). It has not yet been able to free itself from the scruples of private morality. Even unexpressed, the hope predominated to return home from the great catastrophe with 'a white waistcoat' (*Weiszer Weste*). If Bismarck had dreamed that his delicious phrase in praise of Wissmann would some day be used to justify a diplomacy which is more than passive, apologetic rather than masterful, he would at once have protested against the possibility of such a misuse of his words. . . . Our nation, as a whole, did not go to the Front with the idea and the intention of protecting the greatest treasures of humanity. With sound instinct it knew, without a long process of thought, what it had to defend: wife and child, the feeble who remained at home, the work in the home, production of food and munitions, our thriving wealth, what had already been won and would be won in the future, the right to share in all the possibilities of

further development. If you wish to call this 'Kultur,' well and good. You may as well call it honour and greatness, our present and our future. In one word, it was the instinct of national self-assertion which in those unforgettable August days of 1914 rallied to the flag those millions in fulfilment of the duty to which they had sworn joyfully and in free self-sacrifice. It was selfishness in its noblest form; and I only regret that not a German but a perjured Italian has given it its correct name: Holy Selfishness. A small group of sentimental natures could, from the easy-chairs of clubs, feel at most a shiver when the features of this giant struggle for national independence appeared before them. They, 'sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought,' had to support the weakness of their national instinct with the crutches of cosmopolitan phrases. Already in peace time the inventors of the so-called 'Kultur Politik' diluted the immediate vitality of the national passion for self-assertion with a tincture of thought, with the conception of a struggle for universal human ideals.

"Let them do this if it brings them consolation or pleasure; but they must not polute the original purity of true national sentiment with the infiltration of vague thought. They had no right to awaken the belief in foreign countries that their pallid war-aims were also those of the great national community which was struggling for its existence and its future. They ought not to have been allowed to divert the national will from the natural course of its national interests and power into

the direction of general ideals of civilization, thereby enfeebling the natural display of our strength, and, consciously or unconsciously, inoculating German policy with their own sentimentality, from which, according to the words of Von Bethmann Hollweg, the Imperial Government had freed itself. For the present, when it has been universally recognized that England is our enemy, the danger has been diminished. But the desire to carry on 'Kultur Politik,' which emanated from the group round the late Prof. Lamprecht, has infected the radical left, and is biding its time to venture again into the light of day. Thus for the protagonists of 'Interessen Politik,' Frederick the Great's warning has its value to-day as before: 'always on guard!'. . . National policy must be the policy of facts (*National Politik ist Real Politik*). What really hides behind the words 'Kultur Politik' is frequently and generally nothing else than the current Pacifism. The age of Bismarck appeared to have entirely done away with this sentimental rubbish. But the latter years of peace have enabled it again to come to the surface; and at home during the apparent exhaustion of the first winter campaign, it has acquired in certain circles a new lease of life. It flourished most in the first months of 1915, and increased in its growth, in those strata in which it had always existed, during the whole of last year. But out in the trenches, where our youths have flung their lives into the fight singing 'Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles,' the cosmopolitan mist was swept away. At home there are still

shreds of this banner floating about and bedimming the clear vision of national interests. When Scheidemann sent the message out into the world, that what is French should again be French, and what was Belgian again Belgian, the Paris *Journal* could conclude, from its point of view, that German policy would sacrifice its national interests to those of the world. But we, the great majority at home, and the compact Front out there, protest that German soldiers should not give their blood in order that it should become a fertilizer for culture to those who hate us from the bottom of their hearts. Those who have fallen died for their homes and the greatness of the nation. And when the peace which will follow this war is once weighed before the tribunal of history, may it then be in the scales of our own culture which demands wider space in order to develop its faculties. Some day peace will come, and the States and the nations will again live together. It is not *our* business now to see that those who desire to destroy us shall be able to collect the ruined fragments of their national life in order to build up anew *their* Kultur. We need but one thing: namely, that boldly and openly, hand in hand with our Allies, we set to our work. Out of the polyphony of the wills of nations there is formed what God hears as the harmony of humanity. The more the voice of our people joins in the chorus of national interests, the more pleasing will the song be to God. Through might to culture, and through culture to might! The beginning and the end is Might!"

Here, again, we see that striking characteristic of German mentality to which I have alluded above—the apparently complete absence of any impulse which makes for fair-play or gives evidence of the possession of altruistic imagination, sympathy, the sense of proportion or of humour. Now, I am far from claiming that we people of the Allied nations who oppose the Germans are angels pure and simple while they are unmitigated devils; that selfishness is not an inherent and dominant instinct in human nature, and that these altruistic qualities are exclusively ours, and are to be found in every Englishman or Frenchman. As a matter of fact, their effective manifestations in life are rare all the world over. We all of us have had abundant evidence of the dominance of unimaginative selfishness, even in its most brutal form, in the experiences of our daily life. We have met with similar types among our own people to those of the German "asparagus gentleman". The impulses which drive us on to brutal inconsiderateness and selfishness are active among us all. But this can truthfully be said for the French nation as a whole, and for the peoples of the English-speaking nations, that, compared with the Germans of *to-day*, we have been saved from such a sinister relapse into cynical selfishness by two national characteristics, the result of our national inheritance and traditions. The Frenchman—in fact, most of the Latin peoples (though they also have the *défauts de leurs qualités*)—are saved by their more delicate emotional temperament compared with that of the

Northern races, coupled with, and culminating in, a more artistic imagination, which provides them with those elements which create a sense of proportion, a more highly developed social instinct and sensibility, and, in consequence, an impulse towards human sympathy—all of which result in the vivid and effective feeling for the people with whom they deal, and the power of entering into their thoughts. The English-speaking peoples, like the Germans, are not possessed to the same degree of this innate sensibility. But, as I have endeavoured to show below, we have been saved from this relapse into systematic brutality by ages of continuous national habits and practices in representative self-government, and by several other traditions; but, above all, by our sports and pastimes, which have infused into the very backbone of the English-speaking man—and woman—the sense of fair-play, the need for justice in our dealings, even with our rivals and competitors, and this sense has become a constitutional element in our mentality, the leading characteristic of the British and of all English-speaking peoples. It is this which saves us from such manifestations of undisguised brutality as have been shown by the Germans in this war, and as are here formulated, with deliberate clearness and sobriety, in the expression of their war-aims by their political and intellectual leaders.

Now, I feel that I am in no way and to no degree deviating from the strict paths of truthfulness when I maintain that, in none of the public speeches by our

responsible political leaders or by irresponsible literary and political free-lances referring to our war-aims which I have heard or read, have I ever come across statements relating to our activity and aims in this war in which our immediate national interests and needs are put forward as self-sufficient in themselves, without any attempt to justify them by the claims and needs of other peoples and nationalities, and by the ultimate interests and ideals of a common humanity. We may in many respects be as selfish as others. We are often called hypocrites by foreigners because we set so much store by the outer decencies of life, and may even exaggerate the claims to absolute validity and dominance of the ruling traditions and customs of the day. But in our national and political life we always have required, and shall require, some general moral principle to justify our public actions. Ultimately no appeal is so effective in its actual material constraining power over the mass of the English-speaking peoples as the appeal to fair-play and justice, to the rights of humanity, and to the protection of the weaker peoples who are helplessly suffering from the injustice of the strong. I venture to maintain that there is no instance in which the British people have gone to war and have stuck to the fight without such an effective appeal to justice and humanity. Let me but single out a minor instance, which is all the more telling from the fact that it applies to a struggle of actual internal party politics, in which the nation and its immediate interests were strongly divided. The strength and the success of

Mr. Gladstone's Midlothian campaign in 1876 was, to a great extent, due to the eloquent use which he made of the Bulgarian atrocities in stirring up the virility of the British people by such an appeal to their sense of justice and humanity.

But this characteristic is not confined only to England or Great Britain, it extends to all English-speaking peoples, notably also to the people of the United States. They are decried by their detractors, especially the Germans, as "unideal," grossly materialistic, living in the country where only the dollar rules. As a matter of fact, in their actual history in the past, no people has ever been moved to a larger extent by great moral aims and issues. Whatever forces of a more strictly political or even economical nature may have led the North into war with the South, it was, above all, the rights of humanity, outraged by slavery, which speeded the North to battle and to victory. Lincoln knew this and knew his people. With all his sobriety and common-sense, and with his exaggerated simplicity of diction and avoidance of false sentiment, his most effective appeals always were to great moral principles, valid for the whole of mankind. The people of the United States cannot have altered completely since the days of Lincoln and the generation following him, and I submit that those who have the political destinies of the United States in their hands ought to realize this leading characteristic of the English-speaking peoples. It does not require the loss of *American* life and treasure to urge them on to action

and to sacrifice for the sake of their national honour and the cause of humanity. It cannot require even the sinking of an *American ship* or the loss of *American lives;* but the wanton destruction of the ships of a helpless smaller Power in no way a belligerent, but merely claiming the true "freedom of the seas" in following its peaceful avocation, must have stirred the blood of the American people and roused their sense of justice, humanity, and chivalry to such a degree, that the responsible leaders of the American people will assuredly find them ready to live up to their convictions in courageous action.[1]

Let us finally say a word on the true meaning and significance of German Kultur. Much has been said and written about it. It has more than once been pointed out that it is not synonymous with our word culture. Mr. Dibblee[2] has with felicitous acuteness proved that it is a method rather than a moral substance. I have endeavoured to show[3] that it consists chiefly in the most complete realization of the value of intellectual goods (including not only technical, but also scientific, philosophical, and artistic studies and achievements) in their immediate relation to their actual material life. I also endeavoured to show how this characteristic and high development of German life is due, not so much to national or racial temperament, as to the traditions produced by

[1] Since the above was written the United States has joined the Allies in the fight against German militarism and autocracy. In his noble speech to Congress President Wilson has emulated the example of Lincoln.

[2] *Germany's Economic Position.* [3] *Aristodemocracy*, chap. ii.

political and social conditions, the outcome of their past history. One of the chief factors in producing this result was the decentralization of the older Germany, and, within these centres, the effective leadership of spiritual and intellectual forces in no way economical or material in their nature. This condition of true German Kultur has produced that remarkable state of efficiency in every walk of life and of political and military strength when it was commandeered and directed by the State for political or military purposes. All thoughtful men have realized that this outcome of German social and political conditions has produced admirable results in the prosperity and power of the whole nation and of the State. It has rightly been urged that we can and must learn from them in this positive virtue of their people in which they are undoubtedly pre-eminent. But I have also endeavoured to show elsewhere[1] that these important results have been obtained by the efforts of the great men and the great leaders of the older generation, of those who were born before 1870, and who lived to secure and to develop the great traditions of German thoroughness and efficiency within the past generation. Whatever is best in German national life, and what has in reality been effective in producing their great advance and success in the past period, is due to them and to this older tradition. Without it all the methodicity and the direct and forceful bending into obedience and ensuring the commands of the Prussian drill sergeant would have resulted in the

[1] *Aristodemocracy*, chap. ii.

sterile formalization of limited material forces without progress or growth. But all that is bad in Germany is due to the rise of German *Strebertum* within the last fifty years; and for the good of the world we may hope that its deteriorating effect upon the native vigour of the German Kultur of the past, the mistakes which it has produced through haste and superficiality, and the general consequent decadence of the moral qualities of the people will lead to its final defeat.

On the other hand, we must *learn* from the realization of these truths in the immediate history of the German people. While emulating their thoroughness and efficiency in reforms of our national education we must avoid the errors to which the hasty adoption of their system might lead. Our own national life may require the reform of our whole social, political, administrative, and even religious system. Our educational methods may require complete revision. But let us emphatically remember that their efficiency was produced, not by what might be called opportunistic technical education, but by the thoroughness and systematization of their scientific education, from the highest abstract science down to the simplest handicraft; and, above all, by the encouragement and diffusion of all forms of intellectual education, literary and artistic as well as scientific and technical, throughout the entire nation, so that the nation as a whole should understand and appreciate the value of intellectual achievements, and become familiarized with them, ready to apply them practically to its daily life.

I cannot end without some qualification of this emphatic impeachment of the German people, its Kultur and its military obliquity as shown in this war. It ought not to be necessary to point out that the type of German who has thus manifested his moral inferiority is not the only one existing in Germany at the present day. Undoubtedly there are many—let us hope even a majority—who have maintained the virtues and the standards of their progenitors. May they soon come into their inheritance, and on their part wield a power which will control the destinies of the German people. But the fact remains indisputable: that their voice has not made itself heard in this sad epoch of their own history and of the history of the world. Those who have ruled them, and those who speak and act in the name of the German nation, have repudiated the virtues to which many may no doubt lay claim. They may thus have been silenced. But this is not enough to account for the undisputed dominance of the powers of evil in that country. The appeal to the lower instincts and passions, which lie in us all and are a part of the animal side in human nature, has under the stress of war and the misrepresentation of its origin and aim roused these passions among the large mass of the German people to the extinction of their better selves. Under such conditions a willing ear is given to the blandishments or mis-statements of responsible leaders. To quote in their most literal significance the old words, never more true than to-day: "Evil communications corrupt good manners".

II.

TRANSLATION OF THE MANIFESTO[1]

(Contained in the article on "The Situation," by Prof. Dietrich Schäfer, published in "Das Grössere Deutschland," January 27 and February 5, 1917).

CAN there be aimless wars? Even wars of conquest and gain cannot be characterized as such. How could it be otherwise amongst highly developed states which cannot wage war without the expression of a collective will? Thus the German nation when it was forced into war at once endeavoured to become clearly conscious of the object for which it was fighting.

Our Government, in sharp contrast to those of our enemies, has avoided for a long time in any way mentioning the aims and objects of this war. While, on the one hand, the leaders of the Governments opposed to us left no doubt concerning the aim and the object of their attack, the dissolution and annihilation of the German Empire and of Austria-Hungary, on the other hand we Germans maintained complete silence. It was only in 1915 when the war had lasted nearly a year that the declaration came from the lips of the Imperial Chan-

[1] The italics are those in the original.

cellor that we must succeed in preventing any one of our adversaries, whether singly or collectively, ever again to dare attack us—a declaration which said nothing, because it set a task before us which is manifestly unattainable.

It thus naturally followed that an attempt was made by the public itself to answer the question which was in everybody's mind. *Our nation was united in the conviction that its future would have to be secured, and an enormous majority of people capable of judging was convinced that this end could only be attained through the increase of our power.* In saying this no sensible man thought of annexation or incorporation; no thoughtful person desired to absorb new populations as in 1871 Alsace-Lorraine or as in 1866 German states were absorbed by Prussia. But expansion of our power both East and West, if possible also overseas; political and military domination combined, indissolubly connected, with economical expansion, that was the war-aim which we set before ourselves, because it was the only one that contained the elements of durability. *A Germany which would have to endure within its older boundaries an attack like the one we have just sustained for the second time would be exposed to certain downfall.* Our enemies would be better prepared for the second attempt than for the first, and—especially Russia and England—already have within their natural boundaries the advantage of a continuous increase of power such as is in no way to the same extent accorded to Germany. If the increase of our

internal power is limited to the area within the borders of our former Empire our capabilities are narrowly circumscribed.

Therefore associations of professional men, societies, leagues, etc., who formerly had mutual interests, have undertaken to express their convictions on these points in a definite programme. It is true that among these opinions were expressed favouring the so-called *status quo*, a kind of "Hubertusburg Peace". They endeavoured to persuade the German nation that "it should proudly remain content in the certainty, established by this war, that Germany need not fear even a whole world of enemies, and with the unprecedented exhibition of strength which our nation has given to all other nations of the earth, as well as to future generations". But far greater was the number demanding sureties, material guarantees. What has thus been asked for in detail has been made clear with practical completeness in the course of the last few months, in a series of separate publications. But this essay "Zur Lage" has since remained unaccessible to the public. We propose to remedy this here. Yet a few words must be said, by way of introduction, concerning the aims of war in general, as well as to the origin of this essay. To express views on the aims of war by word of mouth or in writing was forbidden. Thus this essay was privately printed and only circulated among the initiated. If so-called quotations were made which it did not contain, it was impossible

to correct such statements. This opened the door to frivolous and malicious exaggerations. Thus, on the side of the Pacifists, the Annexationists (who in reality never existed in that form) were mercilessly dubbed "Landgrabbers" (*Länderfresser*), which was a mild term of abuse applied to them. That the demands which we had put forward had been carefully considered and founded upon the sober study of facts was passed over in silence. It has now been made manifest that they were free from all fantastic excesses as far as the associations, societies, and leagues in the official expression of their opinions are concerned. Deputy Scheidemann ventured to say at Breslau in June that the Chancellor had repudiated the war-aims of the Six Associations as being excessive, and this statement was widely published by the Wolff Bureau. It must now become clear to everybody that, concerning our war-aims in the West, they do not go far beyond the aims of the Chancellor himself, while in the East they may even lag behind his. After repeated pressure brought upon him, and when in the summer of 1915 Galicia was almost entirely free of the enemy, and Poland, Lithuania, and Kurland, together with other districts, were occupied by us, he ventured to express himself much more explicitly than before.

In the sitting of the Reichstag of December 9, 1915, the Chancellor declared: "In my previous speeches I sketched a general outline of our war-aims. Even today I cannot enter upon details. For instance, I cannot

say what guarantees the Imperial Government will demand with regard to Belgium, what foundations of power she will demand as necessary guarantees. But one fact our enemies must clearly realize: *The longer and the more violently they wage war against us the greater will grow the guarantees which we will deem necessary.* If our enemies desire to erect a barrier between Germany and the rest of the world for all times, *they must not be astonished if we fashion our future in accordance with this threat. Neither in the East nor in the West must our enemies of to-day be allowed to dispose of avenues of offence through which they will threaten us anew to-morrow with still greater effectiveness.*

"Why it is well known that France had only made its loan to Russia on condition that their Polish fortresses and railway lines should be completed. It is equally well known that England and France looked upon Belgium as their means of military transit to reach us. We must ensure the possibility of our free expansion against these dangers by political and military means, and we must also secure our economic expansion against these dangers. Whatever is necessary for this end must be attained. *I do not believe that anybody exists in our German Fatherland who does not strive for this aim.*"

Nobody can interpret these words otherwise than as an avowal of the aim recognized as necessary, i.e.: that Germany should dominate in the West over Belgium, and in the East over Poland. (*Deutsche Macht im Westen über Belgien und im Osten über Poland aufzurichten.*)

This same idea is even more fully expressed in the Chancellor's speech of April 15, 1916. He says: "We started out to defend ourselves. But what was then is no more. History has advanced with iron steps, there is no retracing them. It was not our intention or that of Austria-Hungary to open the Polish question; the ordeal of battle has opened it. Now it stands before us and asks to be solved. *After such colossal events history knows of no 'status quo ante'.* The Belgium of after the war will not be the Belgium of before the war. The Poland which has been left by the Russian Chinovnic, who even in haste still blackmails for his bribe, and by the Russian Cossack, who, after looting, has left it in flames, no longer exists. Even members of the Duma have openly admitted that they cannot imagine the Chinovnic in the place where more recently a German and Austrian and Pole have honestly worked for this unhappy land. Mr. Asquith refers in his conditions of peace to the principle of nationality. If he does this, and if he puts himself in the place of his unconquered and unconquerable adversary, can he then assume that Germany will voluntarily restore to the rule of reactionary Russia the peoples between the Baltic and the Volhynian swamps, those peoples which Germany and her ally have set free, whether they be Poles, Lithuanians, Balts or Letts? No, Gentlemen, Russia must not be again allowed for the second time to send her troops to the undefended boundary of East and West Prussia; not again to prepare with French money the district of the Vistula as the avenue

of her incursions into undefended Germany. And, Gentlemen, will anybody also believe that we will hand over the lands which we have occupied in the West, on which the blood of our people has flowed, without security for our future? We shall forge for ourselves material (*reale*) guarantees that Belgium is not to be built up as an Anglo-French vassal-state, and is not to be erected as a military and economic bulwark against Germany. Here, too, there exists no *status quo ante;* here, too, Fate does not retrace her steps; here, too, Germany can no more hand over the suppressed German race to the process of Gallification (*Verwelschung*); but it will have assured to it, responding to its own inherent racial qualities, full development on the basis of its Dutch [? Deutsch] language and individuality." These words of the Chancellor cannot possibly be interpreted in any other way than as they were at the same meeting of the Reichstag by the Deputy Spahn: "*Belgium, which must not be allowed to remain a bulwark of England, will come into our hands politically, strategically* (*Militärisch*) *and economically*".

Now compare these words with the expression of the war-aims made by those who are called "Landgrabbers". As regards Belgium, both in *substance* correspond with one another completely; as regards the East, the demands of the Chancellor exceed several of the demands of the most loudly abused memorials of our war-aims, especially do they exceed those of the *Alldeutsche* and of the Six Associations. France was not mentioned

directly by the Chancellor. But he speaks of "the districts occupied by us in the West on which the blood of our people has flowed". Does this not include French territory, especially the mining district of Briey-Longwy, quite indispensable to us, so urgently demanded by all petitions and, as this war has taught us, necessary for our successful defence so long as the sea may be closed to us? How can Deputy Scheidemann maintain, without contradiction from those whom he attacks, that the Chancellor had repudiated the demands of the Six Associations as grossly excessive? *It must always be borne in mind in making such comparisons that, in all our statements, the dependence of our aims on their realizability from the military point of view has been emphatically, has always been clearly, put forward.*

This has been especially emphasized in the Memorial "Zur Lage" which is here published. It stands in close relationship to a similar Memorial edited by Andreas Gildemeister, which had been submitted to a meeting of Germans at the Künstler Haus in Berlin on June 20, 1915. The latter was submitted to the Chancellor on July 8, 1915, and, before its promoters were prohibited from soliciting further signatures, it had already been signed by 1347 men of academic education, on which account it has been called the Manifesto of the Intellectuals. On November 13, 1915, its publication was forbidden. But on the same day the Memorial "Zur Lage" went to Press, as the changed circumstances had made it necessary to replace the old exposition of our views by a new one. During

the printing, completed by the end of the year, only a few alterations were made. The Committee were obliged to appear before the public as the "Independent Committee for a German Peace" in July, 1916, because of the formation of another Committee, called "The German National Committee for the Preparation of an Honourable Peace". The events of 1916 have been taken into account in the new Memorial "Nochmals Zur Lage" which was completed at the beginning of this new year.

[The opening paragraphs that follow were no doubt drawn up many months ago, and it is strange that the Manifesto should be issued without modification in January, 1917.]

When the well-known Manifesto in which a number of like-minded men were associated, took its first form—the basis of all the others—battles were still raging round the snowy passes of the Carpathians. The Russians had crossed the ridge of the chain in several places and were beginning to descend upon the plains of Hungary. Galicia, except for a small remnant, was in their power; so also was the Bukovina. Even on June 20, when the Manifesto was laid before the Government in the Artists' Hall in the Bellevuestrasse in Berlin, Lemberg had not yet passed again into the hands of its lawful possessors, and the Russians dominated in unshaken strength not only the whole of the Bobr and the Narew, but Warsaw and two-thirds of Congress Poland on this side of the Vistula, whilst on the frontier of East Prussia only a narrow strip of land was held by the Germans in any secure sort of way. North of the Niemen

alone, a daring push forward had carried the German armies as far as Kurland.

To-day the position of things is very different. The whole of Congress Poland, the governments of Kauen [a Pan-German transformation of the ordinary name Kowno] and Kurland, except for an almost negligible remainder, by far the greater part of the government of Vilna, the whole government of Grodno, a greater part of Volhynia, and a lesser part of Minsk, have been occupied, together with all their fortified places, by the armies of the allied Central Powers. The Bukovina is again free. Only in the extreme East of Galicia, the Russian still holds his own in a region of about the size of the Duchy of Oldenburg. Roughly speaking 20,000,000 subjects of the Czar—20,000,000 of his best subjects—have at the present moment been taken away from his domination. Moreover, the merited punishment has been inflicted upon the stirrer-up of the whole huge conflagration; the fire has been quenched in that Serbian region where it began. Our connection with Turkey has been secure; Bulgaria is fighting on our side; the Balkan States which are still neutral will hardly now range themselves with our opponents.

We can therefore look at the situation with other eyes than in the spring. What then could be expressed only as a hope, has for a considerable part become a reality. Even the champions of other views, who then thought that they would hamper our movement by a counter action, have been obliged to recognize the power of facts. The time has therefore come when we ought to put the question to ourselves whether our former programme is fully adequate to present conditions, whether a new form should not be found

for the view in which we are united. We have believed it our duty to answer this question with a Yes.

It goes without saying that in doing this we hold fast to the fundamental ideas of our first Manifesto in their full range—ideas which were expressed so admirably in its Introduction. Now, too, we wish to keep steadily in view the fact that the German people and its Emperor preserved the peace for forty-four years, preserved it to the last limit allowed by national honour and the necessity for self-preservation; that Germany, in spite of the growing power and growing numbers of its people, has never thought of conquering beyond the narrow limits of its European domain, but that it was obliged to go forth into the world-market in order to secure its economic existence amongst the other nations in peaceful competition. We wish once more to emphasize the fact that our enemies desire to confine us within these narrow limits and to circumscribe our activity in the world-market, essential as such activity was to our life; that they formed plans which went as far as the annihilation of the German Empire, and that we have risen up against them with one soul, from the highest to the least, in the consciousness that we must defend, not only our external political and economic life, but above all our inner spiritual and moral life, and at the same time the civilization of Germany and of Europe against the barbarism and greed for domination manifested by our Eastern enemies, against the vindictiveness and commercial envy of our enemies on the West.

What was true six months ago, that, with the help of God, hand in hand with our faithful allies, we could withstand a world full of enemies, we can repeat to-day with even greater

justification—nay, we can confidently say, "We shall be completely victorious". But if we have achieved further successes, we have also made further sacrifices, sacrifices exacted from every one of us, from the first to the last of our people. There is hardly a family in Germany which has not had to give up some of its blood, which has not found itself limited, cramped, oppressed in its daily life. It is a natural feeling to desire to exact retribution for such sufferings from our opponents who, in sinful rashness, have brought them upon us. But such feelings are not to be our guide. Neither will they guide us. *Bismarck's nation knows that politics are no act of vengeance. But it also knows that the State can only be maintained and secured through power. We have proved ourselves stronger than our enemies, let us see that we remain stronger.* It cannot, it must not suffice us what has been expressed by those who make counter-proposals to our own, as "the proudly won assurance that Germany need not fear even a world of enemies". We require the strongest guarantees in the shape of increased and lasting possessions. This is the feeling which exists among by far the greatest part of our people, even down to the very simplest. Because of this conviction, because we aim at securing for our people lasting peace and lasting prosperity in such a form, the soldier is holding out in the trenches and his family is suffering want at home. If we are to be deceived in these convictions, and in these hopes—as happened 100 years ago to Prussia-Germany after the great War of Liberation—the consequences would be far more disastrous than they were then. For no war has borne in its womb so weighty a decision as does this one. *The decision will mean, whether our people will in the future retain in their own hands*

the direction of their fate or whether they will have doled out to them by foreigners their share in the goods of this world. With us it is the question "to be or not to be"; our existence as a great nation is at stake.

Thus it is the duty of every individual to choose his side and to formulate an opinion. Only a determined people can have, and deserves to have, a strong Government. But a Government capable of decided action can and must be strengthened by a clear and weighty public opinion. In its own interest an intelligent Government ought to desire this. Before all, however, in order to create, to clarify, and to determine such public opinion, men are designated who, through education and position, are its natural leaders and protagonists.

When in what follows we venture to develop our plan in detail, *we do this with the full consciousness that we must distinguish between the war-aims for which we must strive, and the conditions of peace which can be obtained; and, that in what we may say we cannot expect agreement in every respect.* The final arrangements will depend too completely upon the success of our arms for us to be able definitely to set out at this moment the lines to be followed; the conception of what is necessary or desirable depends upon too many conditions to admit of an absolute form. *Nevertheless it is important that all those who are convinced that a lasting peace can only be attained through the increase of our power should not desist from considering and discussing in detail the separate issues. The official decision must be left to our political leaders in co-operation with the military leaders and their economic and financial advisers.*

1. France.

In the West the beginning of the war brought us quick and brilliant successes. But the rapid course of victory had to be interrupted, because the Russian advance, begun long before the beginning of the war, made it necessary for us to withdraw considerable forces to the East from the West. Thus, for over a year since the fall of Antwerp (October 9, 1914), the advance had to give way to a form of siege-warfare. It has not been possible to break into any of the links in the chain of strong fortresses by which France blocks the way on its Eastern frontier. Nor has it, up to this moment, been possible to place in German hands any portion of the French coast bordering on the English Channel. It is impossible to determine when our military leaders will think that the moment has arrived again to take the offensive, and to break down the Franco-English resistance. But what remains certain is, that we must win from France by our military superiority the part of her territory which she must hand over to us, the more so as the French have succeeded, owing to the unfavourable nature of our boundaries, as compared with the strength of the fortifications of Belfort, in establishing themselves in German territory, in Upper Alsace and in the Southern Vosges, so that we have not up till now been able to shake her position there.

All the same, *our position as regards France remains entirely favourable.* The districts which we occupy contain one-tenth of the population of France. They are still more important in their bearing upon the economic life of France; for they constitute industrially the richest part, and are far above the average in their tax-bearing capacity. France

misses them painfully. They include the mining districts of Briey-Longwy, which border on Metz, and on our own industrial districts of Lorraine; and the future possession of this district is an economic necessity for us. How far other parts of French territory which we now occupy should be retained by us after the conclusion of peace is a military question, as well as whether parts of France which are not yet in our possession, such as Belfort, the western slopes of the Vosges, Toul, Verdun, and portions of the coast bordering the English Channel, should be taken. That our arms will also here be victorious, whenever our military leaders think that our forces are ready for a decisive action, we firmly believe.

It is beyond all question that, to refrain from such a decision, and forfeit our better protection against France, would meet with keen opposition from a great number of our own people. France has for centuries done everything to keep us weak and disunited; our Empire had to be won through the fight against our malevolent neighbour. She has not since then desisted from persecuting us by her hatred, although we have not been wanting in endeavours to conciliate her. In the present war she has done her best to manifest her blind rage in action. However much we may attribute to the frivolous excitability of the Gallic temperament, there still remains a heavy debt to pay. This explains the widely-held conviction among our own people that it is necessary once for all to settle our account with this adversary, to weaken her to such a degree that she can never again be dangerous to us. Is this possible, even after our complete victory? Is it possible to succeed in this war? Who can answer these questions? Bismarck's well-known

words are referred to in using the expression "*saigner à blanc*". He defined the spirit in which the next Franco-German war was to be carried on, and his prophecy was not incorrect. But that does not yet mean that the result of the war will necessarily correspond to this.

To determine the concessions which we must exact from France we must remember the fact that our rivalry with her differs essentially from our rivalry with England and Russia. But the opinion often expressed that our Western neighbours are a decaying nation, which is bound to continue in its decline, must be met with serious doubts. The energy with which the French have founded a large colonial empire in the last decades, and especially turned Northern Africa to their use, as well as the manifestation of their power in the present war, arouse grave doubts as to the correctness of such an opinion. Still, it remains a fact that the French nation hardly increases in itself, and that it is far from possessing future potentialities such as are enjoyed by England and Russia. We are stronger than France, and will remain her superior increasingly from decade to decade.

2. Belgium.

That this is not the case to the same extent as regards England influences our views on the Belgian question.

We have brought this small neighbouring state into our hands with the rapid grasp of victory. The same reasons which forced us to do this also force us to continue our hold in the future. Had Belgium accepted the offer which we made when we entered her territory, we might have lived on in the belief that in a later war she could not become a tool in the hands of our neighbours. Whoever still holds such

opinions, and still more dares to express them, commits a crime against our people. There is only one alternative: *Belgium must remain under German domination* (*Oberleitung*) *or it will become a weapon against us in the hands of our enemies.* That they would use this weapon more rapidly and with greater skill in any future war than at the beginning of this war, nobody dare doubt. We must reckon with this fact as undeniable. The most vulnerable part of our country lies in immediate proximity to this gate of attack; the most important centres of our industry could be snatched from us by a rapid grasp. It would be a loss which would almost make a continuation of a war impossible. We cannot determine whether fortifications could defend us from it; they would have to be greatly extended. *On the other hand there exists no better line of attack for the German army in a future war with France than Belgium. In considering the terms of peace as regards France, we must remember that here in Belgium, even without the cession of French territory, a weighty advantage over France could be gained.*

Above all, the domination of Belgium improves our position against England.

It is not without good reason that, from the very first moment in which England took part in continental policy down to the present day, she has upheld the principle that Belgium must not be acquired by a first-class Power. Her coast approaches that of England to within about 40 knots, while the distance from Heligoland to the nearest point of the English coast approximates 240 knots. Nothing would prevent the construction of a fortified harbour on the marshy coast of Flanders, which could not be successfully attacked even by the most powerful fleet. The mouth of the

Scheldt is in the possession of Holland; but the way from Antwerp or Ostend or Zeebrugge is only about 10 kilom. longer than our Kiel Canal! We should have a maritime position which England would seriously take to heart before she would again attack us in war. *And only through fear can England be induced to admit of a freedom of the seas which is more than nominal. A written agreement concerning such freedom is worthless, be it through the special adhesion of England or through any Hague Convention. On this point we are surely sufficiently enlightened. But that we need this freedom of the seas, in order to survive in the competition of nations, on that point we are united, even to the pacifists.* All neutral peoples, even those in maritime countries, would greet with joy this freedom; they would become reconciled to the order of things through which we might enforce it. [This evidently was written in anticipation of unrestricted submarine warfare.] Even the Dutch, who feel the pressure of English sea power, understand this painfully. As it is they have only the choice between the Anglo-French or the Germans for their southern neighbours. It is false to say that they prefer the former to the latter. But "the annexation or incorporation (*Angliederung*) of politically independent people, who have been accustomed to such independence, is to be condemned". Thus says the Memoir in opposition to us. It is true that it adds, that "districts which we are to evacuate must not be turned into bulwarks for our enemies, and that no rival of Germany must be allowed to establish himself there," and furthermore says: "The possibility must not exist that the inimical feelings of the inhabitants should be turned into inimical actions which threaten the peace and security of our borders".

Against such dangers the upholders of these views trust "that it will be possible to choose efficient means to strengthen them, and to anticipate dangers". We are not told what means are considered efficient. Those, which by circuitous paths should lead to "annexation," are expressly excluded. But are there any others? Does not history furnish numerous examples? Is it possible to enforce the right of foreign occupation of fortresses, the limitation of military autonomy, let us say, in the limitation of the army, the withdrawal of the right to make foreign alliances or treaties—in fact, to maintain independent foreign relations—is it possible to enforce these without arousing "the inimical feelings of the inhabitants which will readily be turned into inimical actions," and which then again "lead by circuitous paths to annexation"; or, to force us to give up all the rights we had acquired? What, for instance, to-day (when a fortress is something quite different from what it was 100 or 200 years ago), is the right of occupation of a fortress without the possession of the land on which it is erected? Or are we to found our future relations with Belgium merely on the treaty of peace made by one state with another and build up again this monarchy in her former state of independence, only demanding an indemnity? Such an end to this war would surely be felt by the German people as the frivolous bartering of the blood which it has poured out in streams on the battlefields of Belgium. We require safer guarantees after our experiences.

To attain them, the position of Belgium itself will help. "The Belgian nation is politically independent, and is accustomed to independence." This statement surely requires qualification. Belgium became a state only two genera-

tions ago, never having been one before, at most only possessing unity for administrative purposes. "A *national* unity" it never has known, least of all in the days of its full political independence. For just in this latest period the Germanic part, i.e. the more numerous and the more wealthy, has again come to the consciousness and the full growth of its national individuality, resting upon its past and its unity of language. This more numerous and more wealthy part of the population inhabits the district in which, with the exception of Liège, *all* leading cities, rich in historical and cultured memories (Brussels had in 1900 only 17 per cent of inhabitants who only spoke French) belong. There now exists in the land a deep line of cleavage. The political opposition against the Germans, which this war has aroused in every part of the country, would remain the lasting sentiment of the people if the Belgian state were restored to its former independence. *But if a German domination* (*Oberleitung*), *with the determined separation of the Germanic and Romance districts of the country, were introduced, helping the Flemings in the schools, in the Courts, in the administration, and granting adequate rights in political representation to this section, it can be assured a ready acceptance and will attach to itself this Germanic part of the country more and more rapidly from year to year.* Our worshippers of culture ought to realize that the value of Belgium to civilization, its brilliant historical fame, rest with the Flemings, not with the Walloons, exclusively with the Flemings.

The task remains to save this Kultur, German in race and in essence, from being covered and hidden by French varnish.

If Belgium is restored to independence, its *Germanic* character is lost; this can, at best, vegetate on, as was the case

in the Spanish and Austrian periods. The French language and French manners, already outwardly so predominant that the average German who entered the country hardly could recognize his racial relationship, that even our official representatives had become accustomed to regard Belgium as a purely French country—this predominance will grow still greater when it will mean for the Belgians protection against German influence. *The foremost requisite for an effective attachment* (*Angliederung*) *will, therefore, be the complete separation of the Flemings from the Walloons; this implies the dissolution of the Belgian State and a purely Flemish Government and administration for the Germanic parts*, i.e. *for the more populous northern half of Belgium.* That the Flemings adopted Dutch for their literary language a generation ago is most favourable. Their newly-awakened national character has thus gained strong support in their northern neighbours, *and also produces a gratifying strengthening of the national feeling on the part of the Dutch.* Nearly ten million representatives of the same language! There are ways of bringing the Flemings again into touch with scientific instruction, which to-day is given them exclusively in French, forming a cancer eating into the vitality of the Flemish people of which the noblest among them are painfully conscious. It is not necessary to govern the Walloon remainder of the country uniformly. The districts of the Ardennes and the Meuse (the military domination of which is especially important), can be organized separately. The Belgian province of Luxemburg belonged from 1815 to 1839 to the German Confederation; in the easternmost arrondissement (Arel) German is spoken even to-day. That the accretion of Belgium would bring us an important increase in economic

power need only be lightly indicated. In proportion to its inhabitants, Belgium has after Holland by far the largest foreign trade of any country in the world; to a degree it owes this favoured position to the fact that it is the means of exit for Germany. The enormous commerce of Antwerp is fed by import into the German *Hinterland*, and to a still greater degree by its exports from that country. Not only in trade, but in manufacture as well the part which Germany plays in Belgium is exceedingly important. It is evident that the fusion with the German economic districts will still further increase it. The Hinterland of Westphalia and the Rhine, the whole of the Rhine district as far as Mannheim, nay, as far as Strasbourg, would then be able to bring their entire strength into the expansion of world trade. It can hardly be over-emphasized that our Fatherland will stand in the greatest need of the increase of its industry after this war. The efforts of our enemies, not only to interrupt our communications abroad but utterly to destroy them, will not fail to meet with some success. They will make themselves felt for a long time. But Germany cannot do without the export of its industrial produce; the life of millions of its inhabitants depends upon it, in some respects also the readiness of our military forces. *It certainly is not merely a question of the interests of the "Barons of the factory chimney on the Rhine," or the "Ironmasters and colliery owners," but of the welfare of a most important part of our nation, the neglect of which would bitterly recoil upon us.*

3. Russia.

Quite different are the rights which Germany must assert and the demands which she must put forward in the East.

Since the wars of liberation it has been a fundamental principle of Prussian-German policy during two generations to maintain good relations with Russia. This has been to our advantage. Without such relations our Empire could not have been founded. But they are much mistaken who think that Russia took this stand for any other reason than that she would find it to her advantage, and actually did find it so. Even in the times of Frederick William III and Frederick William IV these relations have repeatedly been disturbed, and the designed estrangement at once began when Germany did not comply with the demands of Russia in Oriental affairs. *To-day the situation is such that Russia sees in Germany the chief impediment to the realization of her Oriental ambitions, and such actually is the case. A reconciliation is not possible unless Russia gives up the ambitions which have urged her on during the last two centuries.* No thoughtful person will expect that she will do this. Whoever expects our present policy to be influenced by the hope of a future alliance with Russia is greatly mistaken. *The terrible danger which threatens us from Russia rests above all upon the almost unlimited potentialities of development of that mighty Empire.* Its population increases too rapidly for our comfort; even to-day it is twice as great as that of Germany, and will attain a much larger superiority in another generation or two. Hardly less than the number of the inhabitants the wealth and capacities of the population are growing; the agricultural reforms which have just been initiated give to the peasant stock of Russia a hitherto unknown strength and importance, and, above all, strengthen Great Russia. In contrast to this, there is a certain stagnation in the inner development of Germany. There is an

ominous slowing down in the increase of the population against which can only be set the growth of the larger cities which absorb the excess of the rural population. Our rural population has not increased since 1870! But upon this the strength of our people ultimately rests; this is the vital source of its power. *Our agriculture could still feed us during this war; but there is a limit marked out for it by the circumscribed area of the land, even under the very best conditions of cultivation; and the difficulty of the task increases constantly. The country itself only offers new sites for settlement to a very limited degree. The preponderance of the urban and the industrial populations will still further grow. We absolutely require an enlargement of our agrarian basis. This can only be found in the East, not in the over-populated West; but in the East this is possible.*

The western districts of Russia adjoining our East-Prussian borders contain agricultural areas which are waiting for irrigation and cultivation on a large scale. Their agriculture stands on a much lower level than the German; a great increase of productiveness, double the amount, or even more, is possible. Expatriation of the present inhabitants has been mentioned. That at first sounds hard. But, in fact, it has already begun in wide districts. The Russians have not given up their old Asiatic methods even now. They have forced not only thousands but millions eastwards. Not many of them will see their homes again. If the Tsar again becomes master, he will send his "Great Russians," and we shall have the Russian *mudjik*, the strength and kernel of the Russian army, close upon our Prussian borders.

It has been objected that we have not people enough to settle anew these forsaken lands. Are there not now more

than a million and a half German agricultural settlers in Russia, faithful and devoted to their employers, models to their neighbours as tillers of the soil? These families are now driven from their homes into misery, while the men are bleeding for the Tsar. We can create for them a new home: are we not to do it? Will our Government not be called to account if they fail to do it? And, will there not be found among our returned warriors thousands, nay hundreds of thousands, who will gladly accept a rural homestead if they can have it? Is the longing for the possession of a farm not ingrained among all our people? And how does the German emigrant feel to-day in the northern interior of the United States and Canada, whither he has emigrated in such large numbers, or in southern Brazil, or in South Africa, or in Australia? Is the possibility excluded that he may turn his face homewards instead? *We have this opportunity—surely the last—to bring our economic forces back to a certain equilibrium, to create a "counterpoise" to "the industrialization and urbanization of our people," and to give them new guarantees for their "bodily, moral, and intellectual health," which only country life can give. We must not miss this chance.* To hear the rustling of the Divinity, and to seize His robes, that is, as Bismarck says, the whole art of the Statesman. He acted thus. This master-skill ought not to be wholly lost among us. *Now that we have been forced to wage war, we ought not to let fall the sword from our hand before we have assured our future. Our eastern boundaries must not remain where they are.* We felt, during those terrible weeks, how the weight of the immense Russian power pressed upon the fertile fields of our Empire and our State. Königsberg, Posen and Breslau, nay Dantzig, lie within their grasp. We

must not lose the opportunity of changing all this. Who dares talk of conquest when one snatches the weapons from the robber who attacks us and carries them home as the sign of victory?

But besides the military difficulties, there are others which would result from the extension of our boundaries towards the East, which, however, have already to a considerable degree been overcome. The mass of the population in these neighbouring districts under Russian rule are not Germans. We must make clear to ourselves their future, especially as to our relation to the Poles. The current conception of centuries of enmity between Germans and Poles is not correct. Germany has been less often at war with the Poles than with any one of her neighbours. It was only the partition which produced the opposition. But had this not occurred, the whole Polish Empire would have come under Russian rule, which would have meant the downfall of the Brandenburg-Prussian State. Through the last partition Prussia became the neighbour of Russia, which it never was before. Through this the Polish question became the Russian question, and the Russian the Polish; they cannot now be separated from one another.

We have been able, in co-operation with our Allies, to carry our arms far into Russia, especially towards the northern parts of our boundaries, though not beyond the eastern boundary of the old Polish Empire. *Still—what must not be overlooked—far beyond the eastern boundary of the Polish race.* Of the 20 millions of Russian subjects who, at present, are under the military rule of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies, only about 9 millions live in the compactly defined districts where Polish is spoken. When

Polish leaders speak of 20 million members of their own people who have voluntarily joined the Central Powers, this is a gross misstatement of the actual facts. The last (and only) census of the Russian Empire in 1897 gave 7,930,000 Poles, of whom 6,750,000 live in the government called Warsaw (Congress-Polen).

East Prussia, in more than one sense the central province of the Prussian State, must be protected against the repetition of the Russian atrocities from which it has suffered.

Were Russia to be victorious, she would certainly arrange Polish affairs only and exclusively in her own interests. Exactly the same is our own duty towards those living now, and to posterity.

We must fervently pray for the further success of our arms in the North. Nowhere was the advent of the Germans felt as a liberation as much as in Kurland. Down to the humblest man our people had the feeling as they entered, that they had come into German territory. Progress beyond the Dvina would increase and strengthen still further this feeling. Livonia, Kurland, Esthonia have been for more than seven centuries sister-countries united through German traditions. It is true that the Germans do not yet represent 10 per cent of the inhabitants; but *their* character filters through the whole, impresses its stamp upon all, and distinguishes it from the adjoining countries, as is at once apparent. It is only malignity or ignorance which can charge the Germans with having suppressed, or even exploited, the Letto-Esthonian population. Whatever has been of advantage to the commonwealth in that country was introduced, and is maintained only through the Germans. If the separation of certain districts from the Russian Empire

is to be aimed at, we must also give an answer to the question as to how they are to be organized in the future.

Germany is called a racial state (*Nazionalstaat*), and one may admit this, in spite of strong admixtures in the East, west, and north. *But just these admixtures with the difficulties inherent in them, imply a warning against further absorption of foreigners, who might take part in the constitutional rights of the Empire. The inhabitants of new dominions* (*Herrschaftsgebiete*) *must retain their internal organization.*

These problems which require solution are certainly difficult. But cannot Germany, which has at its disposal such brilliant leaders in the Army, not also find *men* for Government and administration? We live in great times; are they not to produce great things? Is our nation wanting in the courage that dares to shape conditions with a boldness such as Germany requires? *The time has come and will not come again!* Either now or never must we rend the net which the power and craft of the Muscovite is endeavouring to throw over our heads. It is a question of our existence, *and no compromise is conceivable to which the weightiest objections might not be raised; the weightiest of all is the retention of the boundaries as they now are.* In so many things we have looked towards England, and we have taken England as our model. Let us recall the way in which England rules her scattered possessions all over the earth, by everywhere adapting herself to the diversity of needs. Nobody who has the advancement of civilization at heart can desire the increase of Russian power.

4. England.

We all agree that our relations to England must be fundamentally revised. Our Government and our people

were accustomed and inclined to meet our cousins on the other side of the German Sea in a friendly spirit. It seemed as if historical reminiscences and intellectual affinity drew both nations together. The direction of our foreign policy for many years aimed at a fair and honest understanding with the great maritime power. The result has been a complete failure, the shipwreck of all our hopes and expectations. Though Russia as the protector of Serbia gave the initiative for this war, England was and remains the chief culprit.

How can we protect ourselves against a repetition of such sad experiences? Exchange of goods will naturally again take place; but we believe it is possible to shake the firm position of England as the world market for many products. As the intermediary of international finance, she ought to be excluded under all circumstances. "The freedom of the seas" is in everybody's mouth. We have already said that this cannot he secured through treaties. *Only through power can other maritime nations force from England due regard for their rights;* and we do not yet possess such power; the neutrals who do possess it do not dream of using it. For us everything depends upon the further success of our arms.

Still, there are some points within the Turkish Empire in which England is vulnerable, and, with the help of God, we may strike her there.

5. Turkey.

Our relations with Turkey have in reality been the causes which have drawn us into this war. In the Balkan war of 1912 and 1913 it was made clear to us that the disruption of the Turkish Empire, which was to follow that of the

Hapsburg Monarchy, was the ultimate aim for which it was begun. This we could not allow, and we had to risk everything for the preservation of our Allied Empires. We can now, to some extent, pay back England for her activity in weakening our world commerce in Turkey and the neighbour-countries. The economic competition of England, France, Russia, and Italy, which, especially in the last years, has made itself felt with such exacting assertiveness against us, who were the pioneers, must be repressed. Against all English claims, the Bagdad Railway must be extended by us to the open sea. Unimpeded transportation overland from the North Sea to the Indian Ocean, and even to India itself!

6. Austria-Hungary.

Our relation to Austria-Hungary occupies the thoughts of most people in Germany. All are agreed that it ought to be still more closely knit up. But everybody who more seriously studies the question realizes that there are great difficulties. The Dual Monarchy will emerge stronger than ever out of its trial; but only on condition that it continues with determination to build up its destiny on the basis of the two nations which have proved themselves to be its backbone—the Germans on the one side, and the Hungarians, with the Croatians, on the other.

But the closer linking together of the two great Empires is especially difficult. On the Austrian side it is proposed to fix and to develop still further constitutionally the existing alliance; the three divisions of national representatives are to conclude it immediately for a further period of 25 years, and to extend its scope still further. This might

be a way. Economic unity must be aimed at. It is not likely that it will be possible to attain this in the form of a complete customs union; but greater facilities for commercial intercourse, which could not be tampered with, might easily be introduced. Still, we must always take to heart Bismarck's teaching, that economic and political questions must not be mixed up; the idea of strengthening one's Allies by making important sacrifices oneself requires careful and conscientious examination.

7. The Mid-European Confederacy.

Frequently, in enthusiastic and rhetorical phrases, a Mid-European Confederation of States has been demanded and praised.

No doubt such a union might be desirable; and it is quite certain that Germany would not misuse its natural predominant position in it, as was once the case in the Napoleonic system of states. But on this very account this could only be obtained by the voluntary adhesion of each member. All of us hope and believe that Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Bulgaria will remain in political and economic touch, and that they will endeavour to advance the interests of one another. But what the position of the neutrals will be cannot now be predicted with any certainty. We must recognize that their attitude varies considerably; none of the smaller neighbours have manifested unqualified sympathy with the Central Powers. Furthermore, *under no circumstances must such a Federation result in the burdening of Germany with the interests of the smaller states.* She might offer them economic advantages, and would, above all, guarantee them their present possessions. Germany and

Austria-Hungary do not covet any of their lands; but they must not weigh themselves down, on the other hand, with the weight of military protection. Every member of this Federation must assist in carrying this weight up to his own capacity. We are justified in doubting whether, under the existing military systems of some of these states, this would be the case. That every danger of war would be averted by the mere existence of such a Federation can only be held by incorrigible pacifists. Each state will be estimated according to its military power, and will only be secured through this; and it must not be overlooked that more than one of these smaller states has its own difficulties as regards powerful neighbours. It would be the greatest mistake if Germany and Austria-Hungary were to take the first steps in forming such a confederacy. The smaller powers must themselves express a desire for adhesion.

8. Colonies.

There are some people who would entirely renounce further increase of territory in Germany if this war were to increase our colonial possessions. We cannot oppose too strongly this opinion. *We must never conclude a peace which would not restore to us our Colonies so far as they are now occupied by the enemy, or replace them by others.* At most in the Far East one might admit a withdrawal. As to Belgium, we desire to retain her Congo Colonies.

To strive for further extension of our possessions beyond the seas before our power has been firmly consolidated in Europe, before we have put ourselves in the position to meet all future attacks more securely than has been the case in this war, would constitute a crime to our descendants, and would place

them on the road to destruction. We are, above all, a continental power. If we are firmly anchored in Europe, we shall also have a voice in the world, and the overseas possessions which we might require will not be wanting. We must also bear this in mind in discussing the peace terms with France. If certain economic interests point in this direction, they are to be promptly repressed, in view of our national interests. These are to be decisive and no others. Now, and above all, we must strive to secure and to extend our own nationality.

For we do not aim at English sea and world dominion. If we should succeed in breaking the chains which the Island Empire has forged round us in world-traffic, as has been clearly proved to everybody by this war, we must not replace them by new ones. We desire for ourselves freedom of communication in war and peace, and through ourselves we acquire them for everybody else. Prominence in international commerce is only to be gained through free competition. We do not wish to replace England by Germany on this earth; we only desire freedom of action beside her and the other nations, "our own place in the sun".

With cynical candour our opponents say that they mean to annihilate us. Neither our Empire nor our nation are to retain their independent existence. Our peaceful work is to be crippled for all time, thrown back to the state of slavery which was forced upon us by the Thirty Years War, from which we could then arise again, but from which, under the present conditions of the world, we should hardly ever be able to emancipate ourselves. Through shameless calumnies our enemies seek to make us the object of hatred and contempt, and there are not a few neutrals who credulously or

maliciously repeat their lies. Responsible statesmen join the chorus and revel in accusations and suspicions against us. A King, who wields the sceptre over unscrupulous sinners against the laws of the world, dares to charge us "with having trampled International Law under foot".

We no longer mind this. We no longer respond in the same tone. None of our leaders has transgressed the measure of decent defence in his replies. We do not requite evil for evil if they call us Huns and barbarians, decry our intellectual life and seek to bring it into contempt. We know that, beside our own culture, other cultures exist. For centuries we have been in closer touch with them than any other nation has ever been with the spiritual life of foreigners. We do not intend to give this up; but we have been taught how the foreign mentality of the present is to be esteemed, and we must not forget this lesson. We shall in the future take to heart what this war has made clear to us concerning the significance of intellectual exchange and intercourse between nations—namely, that the indispensable conditions for the existence of a nation are not based upon such exchange, but on the strong and independent internal life of each state, and that they stand and fall with this. We came late into the possession of such life, and have had to win it after long and arduous fights.

In inextinguishable gratitude our people remember William I and his Paladins, who led us to the ardently-yearned-for consummation of our destiny. We owe it to their memory that we should make their work secure. But, in the position of affairs created through those who envy and hate us, we can only do this if we increase our power. Whoever teaches anything else teaches error. May God bestow upon our leaders

insight and will power that they may strive for this end, and this end alone! The vast majority of the nation will willingly follow them. Germany owes this not only to herself, but to the whole world. For only thus will it secure its own Kultur which is, and remains, a treasure of which humanity cannot be deprived. It is not our enemies, but Germany, who fights for the liberation of all nations in the struggle for her own freedom.

III.

THE SOCIAL GULF BETWEEN ENGLAND AND GERMANY.

KIPLING'S often-quoted words, "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet," no doubt contain a great element of truth; but they may often be misapplied and lead to sociological generalizations and to fundamental fallacies most disastrous in their effect. These disastrous over-generalizations result when what might broadly be called the influences of environment and of direct education upon the development of national as well as individual character are ignored or wilfully minimized. I feel confident, for instance, that a man of the type of Ranjitsinhji (of whom there are many) has imbibed many characteristics typically Western and specifically English which have become part of his very nature; as I also feel sure that a pure-blooded Englishman, brought up in the East from earliest childhood in Oriental surroundings and under Oriental influences, would differ in some of his fundamental habits and views of life and conduct from the ordinary Englishman.

To put at once the main thesis of this restricted inquiry I should like to state what I have to say in an exagger-

ated form, and maintain that Germans and Englishmen (including all English-speaking people) will never understand each other until the spirit of our national sports and games has entered *freely* into the German national mentality and character. In spite of the apparent survival of racial faults, attributed to the Germans even in the time of Tacitus, which the origin and the conduct of the present war strongly recall to our mind, I do not think that the discrepancy and opposition between Germans and Englishmen are a question of race, but rather one of the system of conscious and unconscious national education based upon history, but especially effective in these latter days.

Now, there are many causes which make for this dualism or antagonism between us which it is not the province of the present short inquiry to enumerate or to dwell upon. I might, for instance, point to a fundamental factor in the difference between the social feeling and the social life of Germany and England as directly affected by the militaristic and bureaucratic organization of German society. This, of course, goes much deeper down into fundamental principles and ideals of life and character between the two nations. At an early period of my temporary residence as a student at Heidelberg, it was pointed out to me by a benevolent critic that I must change my method of salutation when walking in the street. I must not only take off my hat completely, but I must apply varied gradations to the extent in which I raised or lowered my hat in accordance with the rank of

the person whom I was greeting, until, at the highest rank, I must bow my bared head and extend my right hand, holding the hat downwards and away from the body, during the whole time that my superior, who stood with head covered, addressed me. It is no exaggeration to say that a careful observer standing on the *Anlage* (the favourite promenade) during the hour between twelve and one o'clock, when professors, officials, and students took their before-dinner walk at Heidelberg, could distinguish between the social positions of the passers-by—not only between students and professors, but the different grades of University teachers, from the simple *Privat Dozent* to the *Professor Extraordinarius*, the *Professor Ordinarius*, the *Hof Rat*, *Geheimer Hof Rat*, *Geheimer Rat*, and *Wirklicher Geheimer Rat*—by noting the forms of salutation given and received. It goes without saying that such gradation is more marked in military circles; it exists, however, not only in all official circles of the Civil Service, the Law, the medical profession, but even in the various shadings of rank, wealth, and importance of the industrial and commercial community and the complicated social standing which as a body they may hold to each one of the official or military classes. The establishment of the ideal of the gentleman as a fixed social standard—whatever our social weaknesses and vices and tendencies to so-called snobbishness may be—which strikes the keynote of our social life and which more or less implies the axiom that all gentlemen are, as such, equal in social intercourse, does not exist in Germany.

Now, it will readily be perceived how the German system lends itself to the blunting of the sense of justice in the free intercourse of men, how it counteracts the sense of social fair-play, and how it must favour the development of truculence of manner and character, of the reign of the "bully" throughout the whole nation. For the differences of address, treatment, and intercourse do not end with the form of salutation, but extend to the tone of address in speech and manner, constantly impressing the superiority of the one and the inferiority of the other. We can well understand how tactical rapidity, promptness, and smartness of evolution in military bodies are necessary for strategic success, and that the words and tone of command must be short, abrupt, and decisive; while the response to the command must be immediate, manifest, and unquestioned. But when we leave the barrack-room and the drill-yard it is not likely that the extension of such a tone into the ordinary life of all members of the community will facilitate and encourage free intercourse, will raise the self-respect of those who are forcibly, manifestly, and continuously placed in a position of inferiority; nor that it will endow the favoured superior with a sense of considerateness and sympathy towards his fellow-man in ordinary life. Above all, it will not yield opportunities for the exercise of that sense of fairness and social justice in dealing with our fellow-man which enables him to realize his claims to consideration and to act accordingly.

If this and other social institutions and characteristics

of Germany, diametrically opposed to our own as they are, make a mutual understanding between us impossible, they may be said to apply more directly to adult life; though, as a constantly-present example, they must also affect the character and the habits of the young who grow up in a constant repercussion of such social impressions. But we must go further back to the earlier stages of juvenile education if we wish to appreciate one of the chief factors which make for such national difference and antagonism. This factor is to be found in the national games and sports which the English people possess and of which the Germans are deprived.

As an ultimate proof of the truth of my generalization, I might point to two more remote tests of a more complex nature.

First, it will be found that, though in the more distant and the more immediate past, that section of the German, as well as other continental peoples, who have been "liberal" in their principles and aspirations, have generally been friends and admirers of England, while the reactionaries have, as a rule, been Anglophobes, a large section of German and Austrian society, men who might politically have been opposed to us, have always shown a strong preference for this country, its character and its mentality, and have, on the whole, understood us well and estimated us fairly—*if they were sportsmen.*

Still more instructive and suggestive is the following fact, for the truth of which I can fully vouch. Among American men of German extraction there were in the

past—and no doubt are in the present—two distinct groups. These groups, by instinct, breeding, taste, habits, and ideals of life, public and private, were strongly differentiated and were in fact antagonistic to one another. This difference no doubt had something to do with their more or less complete use of the English language. But the efficient cause of such difference or antagonism must be traced back to their home- and school-education. Roughly speaking, it may be maintained that the difference depended upon the schools which they attended, the same influences no doubt being reflected in their homes as well. The boys who attended schools with German masters, or with the fixed traditions of German school education prevailing there, differed essentially from the boys who attended the dominant American schools with the prevalence of English-speaking traditions. It was not a question of moral or intellectual training; but the effective difference arose out of the sports and pastimes of the boys, developed on the English lines in the one, and restricted to German system and discipline in the other. From youth upwards, through all phases of adult life, there was a want of understanding between these two groups of Americans of German extraction, and a marked line of cleavage can to this day be drawn between them.

Now it is not only for the purposes of physical culture, the strengthening of the body and relaxation of the mind, that our games and pastimes affect our national life and character; it is not even for the development of

manliness and courage which are required to face a fast bowler or pitcher in the cricket or base-ball field, to rush at a powerful opponent in football, or to negotiate a stiff fence in the hunting field, but for their moral outcome, that we value them as a great national asset.

More efficiently than in almost any other sphere of life are the young men here taught the subordination of their own desires to a collective end and purpose, the suppression of fear and of all forms of self-indulgence. Yet—and this is the most important point which I wish to emphasize—however keenly and passionately this end of victory is desired, the game itself must be played according to rules of justice and fairness, everything must be done to give the same fair chance to the opponent. This means a supreme effort and a successful achievement in self-detachment, which, in the philosophical language understood by the learned Germans, would be called "objectivity" or "altruistic imagination," in which, for the time being, the personal desires are ignored, and the other side, the opponent's side, is taken. The story of Marshal Canrobert's visit to the playing fields of Eton after the Crimean war is thoroughly illustrative of this moral result of sportsmanship. At a cricket match between Eton and some rival school one player of the Visitor's side failed through illness. An Eton boy was selected to take his place. "You are not going to persuade me that the Eton boy will do his best to defeat his own side!" said the Marshal. The French may not have realized our outstanding national virtue then; they have

done so since, and are rapidly assimilating it within their own national genius. Nor is this spirit in any way confined to the select boys of Eton; it has permeated all layers of the nation, to the yokel and the factory-hand. To charge any Briton or American with unfairness in play is perhaps the greatest insult which can be hurled at him. Though many a man, and even a group of men, may in truth lay themselves open to this charge; though many an umpire whose decision was unpalatable to the backers of one or the other side may have had a rough time of it, such transgressions of the uncodified law of sport are emphatically repudiated in the end, and no man would dare to stand up and boldly assert that the laws themselves were not valid and that the players must not respect these laws. In so far individual transgressions only confirm the universal validity of this sense of fair-play. This applies even to horse-racing. Of all sports those connected with the horse ought to be the noblest, as in the past chivalry and the "cavalier" were bound up with this association. Unfortunately, owing to the fatal intrusion of money interest, horse-racing has become the most degenerate form of sport. Still the rules of fair-play are confirmed in their validity by the disqualification and punishment of riders as well as owners and even horses who transgress these rules. The more utility and interest, and especially money value, are introduced into the practice of any sport, the greater is the danger of its degeneration from the higher moral spirit and influence which it has for the nation. Fortun-

ately this is not yet the case with most of those games and contests in which the large mass of the people take an active part. But from the fact that these abstract laws of fairness and justice are the very soul and essence of such games, that they are ever present in the minds of the players and impress their stamp by continuous repercussion upon the very soul of the participants during the most impressionable period of their lives—from this fact it will readily be perceived how important they are in the production of what we might—not without some pride—consider to be the leading characteristic of the British people.

If this influence is fairly manifest in the case of those organized games in which larger numbers co-operate for a common end and meet an antagonist to whom they must show fairness, it even applies to those minor games in which the individual plays more "for his own hand" and which have in so far been (I maintain wrongfully) decried by the upholders of our great national sports. I am thinking especially of such a game as golf. But, at the risk of becoming trite, I would but suggest to the critic what it means to find that a player, most keen to win, standing alone before his ball, badly placed in a small cavity, out of sight of his opponent or of other people, would not for a moment dream of moving his ball but half an inch into a better position in order to get a better hit at it; that such a transgression of the rules of the game would appear to him a base and wholly dishonest act. I am optimistic enough to think that

there is but an infinitely small proportion of golfers—if any—who would commit such a sportsman's crime. We may take such a slight instance from the frivolous side of our life for granted and pass it over. But I would further insist upon the full realization of what such a simple instance means. From the very lightness and triviality of such a daily occurrence in the recreative side of our existence, the weightiness of the moral result stands forth all the more powerfully and significantly. To imagine a young lad, burning to defeat his opponent and placed in absolute freedom from detection, who with a very slight kick of his foot or a dragging of his club might add to his chances of victory, yet sternly resists such a temptation because it is unfair to his opponent, because it is not "playing the game," because it contravenes a purely abstract moral law—this is to my mind one of the highest achievements of morality. A nation that as a nation is imbued with this spirit cannot act unfairly to another nation. And if, in human frailty, unfairness should be committed, the crime will not be cynically condoned, neither by the leaders nor the mass of the people, by such phrases as "necessity knows no law," or the "scrap of paper". The English sportsman, who with a smile and a shrug of the shoulder takes his beating and admits that "the other man proved the better one of the two," would have had more humour than to cry out against the use of gases by the other side had he been the initiator of this practice in warfare. He would be more able to display the much-vaunted

scientific "objectivity of mind" the possession of which the German professors consider their peculiar privilege.

Nothing has caused more astonishment to those of us who in the past admired the scientific achievement of the learned men of Germany, men who have passed their lives in devoting themselves to impersonal study and mental discipline, than their utter incapacity to consider the other side of the question in this great national conflict. But to those of us who have a more intimate acquaintance with the psychology of these Germans, and especially with their early training and breeding, this phenomenon is not inexplicable. There are several reasons which account for it; but nothing more than the absence in their early training of the development of that sense of fair-play, and in their adult life of those practices of self-government with which even the members of our Parish Councils have become constitutionally familiar.[1]

[1] I should like to recall two typical instances of this deficiency in the ordinary mentality of the German savant. Some years ago, at an International Congress of Archæological Studies, I found myself in the chair at a meeting of one of the sections. The paper read happened to be one on a subject with which I had for years specially occupied myself; in fact on which I had published a monograph some years before. After the paper had been read and the discussion had practically reached its end, I felt it but right that I should also give my views on this question. I accordingly asked an archæologist from the body of the hall to take my place in the chair while I proceeded to take part in the discussion. An eminent representative of German science, backed by his national colleagues, declared my participation in the discussion to be out of order. In my attempt to justify my procedure I met with such crass ignorance as to all forms of public debate and such incapacity to take a fair view

This national failing of the Germans of all classes, as compared with English-speaking people, is especially due to the absence of that early and continuous training from childhood upwards which is afforded by our national games and pastimes. The sense of fair-play cannot be acquired by one conscious intellectual act of volition, adopted for the time being, in order to direct human conduct. Moreover, the chief effect upon conduct and its essential modification of character, in order that it should become what the ancient Greeks called an *Ethos*, is dependent upon the fact that these games and their implicit laws of fair-play should be spontaneously

that I had to discontinue the discussion on parliamentary procedure and to *brusquer l'affaire* in insisting upon my ruling as chairman in spite of the protests of the Germans. Another instance I shall publish more fully on a future occasion, as it throws a striking light on the political and social precursors of this war. I will merely mention in outline that, immediately after the conclusion of the Graeco-Turkish war in 1897, a series of articles appeared on the origin of that conflict in the *Gegenwart* of Berlin, a weekly paper of the very highest standing. One of these articles, by the eminent German philosopher Eduard v. Hartmann, was a violent diatribe against England and English policy, and contained the most ludicrously mendacious statement that England was responsible not only for the Graeco-Turkish war, but also for the Armenian massacres, which it had produced or encouraged for its own selfish purposes. The article in question was sent to me by one of the most prominent personalities in Germany, fervently anxious to maintain good relations between Germany and England. As I happened to be fully acquainted with all the facts and circumstances concerning that war, I wrote a temperate reply to Eduard v. Hartmann in German, and sent the article to the late Eduard Bamberger, at one time editor or proprietor of the paper. Neither he nor my influential friend in Germany could succeed in gaining publication for the reply to this gross libel on England.

evolved and established in perfect freedom by the players themselves. Any interference from without, any constraint in their free development and practice, in so far counteract their moral influence. They rob play of its playfulness and spontaneity; they eliminate the sense of honour from the constraining power of its injunctions; they remove freedom and self-government from the youthful community of players. This the Germans have never understood. Gymnastic training under a master, games established by law or by royal or imperial edicts, systematized on hygienic and militaristic principles directly to serve militaristic and bureaucratic purposes, must counteract the very moral effects in the production of character which our own games have given us as one of our greatest national assets. On the one occasion when I met Count Zeppelin many years ago, at a dinner at the late Field-Marshal's, Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar in London, he had returned from a tour "round the world" and had visited the German colonies. In the course of conversation he remarked that the Germans would never be a successful colonizing nation until they adopted the British spirit of sportsmanship, and he illustrated his statement by some interesting examples showing the essential difference between Germany and England in this respect. Many prominent Germans, including their leader-in-chief, long ago realized this quality in Englishmen and this want in the development of their own national character. But they never could practise the self-effacement of giving full freedom to such institutions;

the command and the laws governing it had always directly to come from above and unquestioningly to be obeyed from below. Even within the last few months we have again had evidence that, in spite of their insincere criticism of our inherent want of seriousness in allowing our troops at the Front to play football and other games, they realize the supreme value of our athletic spirit by bestowing upon us the sincerest flattery of imitation. But the form which their new endeavour is to take is again most characteristic and demonstrates the utter impossibility of assimilating into the German mentality (as it is and as it has been fashioned by years of bureaucratic, militaristic, and autocratic rule) the essential nature of sport and its inseparable concomitant, self-governing independence and essential freedom of *play*. We learn from *The Times* that—

> The German Imperial Committee for Olympic Games, after consultation with all the affiliated sports associations, is trying to promote a Bill which would make every German who is liable to military service liable also to "regular physical exercise" up to the time of his entry into the army or navy. There would be an elaborate scheme of official control, with powers of punishment placed in the hands of teachers and trainers. The minimum weekly exercises—of which the victims would take their choice—are specified as follows: One and a half hours of marching, football, or hockey; three hours of gymnastic exercises; one hour of running, skating, or ski-ing; three hours of walking or swimming; one and a half hours of cycling or rowing; or one hour of wrestling or boxing.

The French have of late years also realized the national value of our sports and pastimes, and the work of the *Société pour l'Encouragement des Sports Athlétiques* during the last thirty years has gone far, in combination with other moral factors, to produce the characteristic spirit of the French army and of the heroic defenders of Verdun. But in France this movement has been unofficial and spontaneous, and has avoided the deadening and dissolvent effect of the German drill-sergeant.

I have for many years, while lecturing to large masses of working-men in every part of the kingdom for the Gilchrist Trust,[1] endeavoured to impress upon the people at large the true value and significance of sport in our national life. The main object of these lectures was, it is true, to arouse interest in art as well as in science among the people in order to supplement "the physical side of play" by the intellectual and moral side of play, which produces the love of pure science and pure art. But I thought it well, while insisting upon our shortcomings and our great needs on the side of culture, to admit, and even to emphasize strongly, the national quality of fair-play in which I believed we were preeminent and which was directly the outcome of these national institutions. At the same time I endeavoured to the best of my ability to impress upon my audiences of working-men the need and the duty to keep the spirit of our sports and games pure—i.e. to banish from it

[1] See also "Ruskin and the Sports and Pastimes of England" in *The Work of John Ruskin*, pp. 168 *seq.* (1893).

entirely the mercenary spirit, the intrusion of all money interest, and the degrading spirit of professionalism, which often led the men themselves to desist from taking part in the game and merely to watch the paid professional play for them, intensifying, or rather diverting, the interest from the sport itself to the gambling interest centering round the money which they had spent in backing one side or the other.

Whatever we do in reforming our educational system, whatever efforts it may be necessary for us to make to ensure efficiency in the economical work of our country, let us remember two sacred aims which must always remain before us. First, that we retain undefiled the spirit of science, learning, and art, which, in its purity, as it was fostered in the Germany of old, is really the efficient cause of any success they may have had in commerce or in war, and not the narrow empirical and ephemeral development of industrial and commercial science alone. And, second, that we retain and foster, in our educational institutions as well as in our adult life, our national games and pastimes out of which, to a considerable extent, our most characteristic national virtue has grown.

No doubt their importance in schools and their exaggerated, if not exclusive, hold on the mass of the adult population may be out of proportion to their intrinsic value and to the other aspects and duties of life. The supreme admiration of the small boy at school for his athletic hero may carry with it disregard for the

victor in the intellectual studies of the school; and this worshipping of false idols may even be encouraged by ignorant and vulgar parents of low ideals. No doubt the sporting interests of the masses of the people, as is proved by the manner in which the daily Press caters for them, may be over-stimulated and degraded by forms of cupidity which have but little to do with true sport, and they may fill the leisure of these classes to the exclusion of all higher, all more intellectual and moral forms of recreation. But the task before us is to reduce these various sides of national life to their proper proportion in order that the whole life may be sound and normal; and we must jealously guard the purity of the essential spirit of these sports and pastimes themselves and free them from every taint of the mercenary spirit as well as from the dominance of professionalism.

There is no reason why there should not exist specialists in sports and games as there exist specialists in every occupation, every science and art. They may tend to fix or raise the standards of proficiency as the professional artist on any musical instrument will establish the highest standards for such performance. But as this does not turn the love of music among the mass of people into the business of life, so little must the exponent of the greatest skill in each game turn the freedom of these games into a business. Our sports and pastimes belong to the recreative side of life when work is done; they cannot fill the whole of our life. Moreover, freedom and fairness are the very essence of these games. This

freedom demands that they should not be made the business of life, and fairness demands that no undue advantage should be given to him who has perverted the play into the business of life.[1]

As regards the juvenile stage—sports in schools—the subordination of games to the general proportion of school life must be ultimately tested by the contribution which is made through them to the production of the perfect boy: the good scholar who will make an efficient man in the business of life, the boy with the most straightforward and manly character possessed of courage and of chivalry, as well as the boy distinguished in all forms of sport. Our public schools and universities have produced individuals representative of a type which approximates closely to such an ideal. I could single out names of

[1] It is this side which those who are responsible for the Olympic Games must jealously guard. I do not only refer to the exclusion of the manifest "professional" (though there is no reason why the professionals should not have a contest of their own, chiefly as a demonstration of the highest skill in the sports themselves); but the danger of intruding the professional point of view and atmosphere into the pursuit of amateur athletics through the agency of professional teachers and coaches, the invention and application of methods and devices foreign to the exercise of the sport itself, which have as their direct and ultimate aim the winning of the contest irrespective of the sporting or "playful" side which must always remain the purpose and soul of the game or contest. The great quality of ingenuity and inventiveness, and the vitality and energy with which every pursuit is taken up by them, forms the danger in this direction of the American people above all others. No doubt the contestant must direct all his energies upon victory; but he should always realize, before the battle takes place and in the training for it, that it is in recreative sports and games, the essential object of which is recreation and friendly rivalry, health, and enjoyment, that victory is to come to him.

men of the highest moral and intellectual character who have been distinguished alike as scholars, as cricketers, oarsmen, football Blues, athletes, and even as polo players. They have abundantly proved that efficiency on the one side need in no way exclude eminence on the other. Yet what they stand for, and what they ought to dominate, is the co-ordination and harmonious adjustment of these various aspects of civilized life as a ruling ideal for the life at school as well as for the wider life of the adult community at large.

As regards the adult stage of sport in our national life we must not only counteract professionalism in its grossly manifest form, but in a more insidious, and in so far more dangerous, form—i.e. in the sportsman who is that only and nothing else in life. I do not mean by this such holders of honorary positions who make sport in its wider organization at all possible among us; I do not mean the gentlemen who unselfishly devote themselves to the organization, the support, and development of our cricket and football clubs, rifle associations in town and in the country, and devote their energies to such public service; I do not mean the efficient Masters of Foxhounds who perform their task with keenness and intelligence, and thus provide health and amusement to hundreds of those whose occupation in life lies elsewhere. But I mean those whose chief business in life consists in "having a good time" and who devote all their energies to sport in one form or another. To take the form of sport most assailed by those who hold a more highly

moral or democratic view of life—i.e. foxhunting—I am one of those who maintain that there is ample moral and social justification without inherent degrading cruelty in this sport to justify its position in our national life. I also maintain that its tendency is truly democratic. To bring together representatives of all classes in a certain district, from the peer to the tenant-farmer, the professional man and even the tradesmen of the country towns, in this healthy and manly form of recreation is a good social object and certainly contributes to the very important function (which economists and popular legislators ought emphatically to bear in mind) of relieving the monotony and diversifying the amusements of the dwellers in the remote country districts, where the life, compared with that of our larger cities, does not overflow with recreative amusements. I even have a word to say in favour of the "absentee" foxhunter, the busy professional man or the man from the "city," who takes his weekly day-off in finding pleasure in this healthy form of recreation in the country—provided always he duly recognizes his obligation to acknowledge the hospitality he receives in the country by not needlessly injuring the crops and fences of the farmers over whose land he rides, and by duly contributing his share in compensating for such loss. There is no reason whatsoever why this hardworking man should not be welcomed by his rural fellow-sportsmen. But often foremost among the unkind critics of these "intruders" is a class of sporting degenerates for whom there is no moral justification. Its members are

those who settle in the country for no other object than sport. They take no part in the actual business and duties of the country-side, neither own nor till the land over which they ride, but devote the whole of their working-day, all their energies, and what remains of thought to the pursuit of the fox. When this pursuit is no longer practicable they find some other form of amusement to revive their jaded spirits and to fill their empty existence. It is they who bring sport into disrepute and whose influence is thus as powerful for the bad in perverting the true and beneficent spirit of sportsmanship within our national life as is the influence of professionalism.

The fault here again is the want of proportion in life and the misdirected ideals of manly existence. It cannot be stated too strongly and insisted upon with too much emphasis that the true and adequate formulation of the ideal of man as the perfect social being affects and directs, practically and most pervasively, the conduct of a nation. I have made it one of the chief objects of my book *Aristodemocracy* to develop and to impress this fact as the primary end of all social ethics, in that each age, as it is modified by time and by the circumstances of its history, must formulate anew, with absolute truth and clearness, the ideal of conduct, the ideal of the Gentleman. The most difficult task, it will generally be found, is to free these ideas and this ideal from the conventional and misguided direction which one-sided exaggerations in social organization are in the course of time most

likely to produce. This is especially the case when, hidden below the misleading excrescence, there lies a justification in fact or in morals, which justification no longer exists and is no longer effective.

It is thus that in the denotation of the Gentleman, who replaced in our life the element which was furnished by chivalry in olden days, there was the conception of the Gentleman as the "man of leisure," or, at all events, the man who was not tied down to any fixed pursuit for material gain. The moral justification for such a limitation lay in the fact that the tradesman and man of business had habitually and constitutionally to consider the increase of wealth, the making of money. From the social point of view he was thus naturally preoccupied in his attitude towards his fellow-men; nor did he meet them with the same complete freedom which marked the intercourse between those who derived no material gain from such intercourse. The same applied to the professional man, the lawyer, the doctor, the clergyman, and even the scholar. These men, moreover, owing to the necessary specialization of their life, were not able, by a continuous line of action resulting in habit, to cultivate what in one word Lord Chesterfield and the gentlemen of the eighteenth century called the *Graces*. In so far there was some justification in the inclusion into the denotation of the "gentleman" of the man of leisure or the man of fashion.

Here, however, is a striking illustration of the need for periodic revision of our ideals of social ethics, which are

intimately associated with our deepest morality in the changing course of history.

The man of leisure, in this acceptation of the term, must go. Our ideal of the gentleman emphatically includes efficiency in some work of life, however much the organic normality of our mind and our character is to be restored in recreation, and the "graces," physical, mental, and social, may be cultivated and effectively manifested in our intercourse with our fellow-men.

The reply of the American to his English visitor's question whether "there existed in America gentlemen, men of leisure," "we call them loafers," is thoroughly justified by history and fact. They are the parasites of human society. They are the professionals in leisure and play and amateurs in work. Our ideal of a gentleman is an amateur in play and a professional in work. But it is in the interest of society, and in harmony with our moral sense, that within this work the greatest distinction and the highest recognition from society as a whole is to go to him whose work is most directly conducive to the public welfare, and is not aggressively selfish and unsocial. Whatever his work, he must uphold, not only the highest social morality in his intercourse with his fellow-men, but also, as a social being, the Graces of life, thereby directly adding to the equable flow and the benevolent beauty of social intercourse.

In short, we aim at the ideal of a perfect man, normally developed on all sides of his nature, physical and mental, in himself and as a social being. It is really the Hel-

lenic ideal of life, in which all faculties of man, physical, mental, social, were to be harmoniously blended and to produce as well the most efficient patriot as the most perfect social being. The supreme fetish of modern Germany, the fetish of "efficiency," expounded on the one side by Nietzsche, on the other by the pronouncements of their captains of industry, which has destroyed even the pure scientific spirit of the Germany of old and has led to the dominance of the modern *Streber*, has found its full fruition in this horrible war of "frightfulness," in which all sense of chivalry and fair-play has been expunged from the consciousness of the German people. Until they assimilate into their national consciousness our own sense of fair-play, and until they adopt in common with us the ideal of the Gentleman in contradistinction to that of the Superman, there will be no understanding between us and we can never co-operate together for peace and the advancement of mankind.

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